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INTRODUCTION 
The doctrine of exhaustion plays an important role in European 
intellectual property law to preserve the free movement of products 
protected by intellectual property rights.  However, despite the 
seemingly uncomplicated principles of this doctrine, a high degree of 
uncertainty as to its proper doctrinal foundations persists as it is applied 
in a variety of different legal contexts.  This Article traces the 
application of the doctrine of exhaustion through the different legal 
contexts in which it is applied, assesses the status of the doctrine, 
evaluates the interpretation and scope of the doctrine within European 
Community law,1 and aims to highlight pertinent issues regarding the 
doctrine in relation to both domestic and cross-border issues.  The 
history of the treatment of the doctrine of exhaustion evidences a 
remarkably complex structure:  the formulation of the exhaustion rule 
under Article 30 EC2 was subsequently incorporated into secondary 
intellectual property legislation, and the European exhaustion rule was 
implemented into national laws.  This has made it difficult to formulate 
more refined rules governing licensing provisions restricting the free 
circulation of goods.  This has also resulted in uncertainty as to the 
proper definition of the exhaustion rule and its guiding principles.  As 
discussed in this Article, it has also resulted in an unintelligible equation 
between the basic freedoms to provide, on the one hand, trade and 
services under European Community law and, on the other hand, to 
provide classification of economic rights in intellectual property. 
I.  THE EMERGENCE OF THE EXHAUSTION RULE 
Article 28 EC incorporates the principle of free movement of goods, 
and it prohibits quantitative restrictions on imports between Member 
States and all other measures of equivalent effect.3  Under Article 30 
EC, however, national law may derogate from the principle of free 
movement of goods if the measure in question is justified and 
proportional in relation to the impact of the prima facie contravention 
of Articles 28 and 29 EC and the specific objective the national rule 
seeks to accomplish.4  In relation to intellectual property cases, the 
 
 1. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3 
[hereinafter EC Treaty]. 
 2. EC Treaty art. 30. 
 3. See id. art. 28. 
 4. Id. arts. 28–30; see Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für 
Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon), 1979 E.C.R. 649. 
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European Court of Justice (ECJ) has established that a violation of 
Article 28 EC may be justified only if the existence of the right is 
concerned,5 which was later specified so as to relate to the specific 
subject matter.6  The doctrine of exhaustion has been employed as to 
underpin these distinctions.7 
Intellectual property lawyers often deem the jurisprudence 
regarding the interface of intellectual property and the principle of free 
movement of goods as an unswerving interpretation of the proprietary 
scope of territorial intellectual property rights within a European 
context.  Thereby, this perception has created a notion that precludes 
any derogation from the principle of free movement of goods.  One 
reason for such a result is the lowest common denominator solution, as 
formulated by the ECJ in relation to territorial restrictions.  The free 
circulation of goods is consistently favored. 
These various issues share common ground:  most of the 
uncertainties concerning the application of the exhaustion rule stem 
from the ambiguities that exist regarding the status and treatment of 
intellectual property rights under European law.  Under national laws, 
intellectual property rights remain territorial, theoretically allowing for 
restrictions in relation to preventing parallel and reimports and, to a 
certain degree, allowing for restrictions on the product market in which 
protection may be offered.8  The ECJ has applied the provisions on 
contractual restrictions on European Community trade9 as well as the 
free movement of goods principle10 in order to curtail the control of 
owners of intellectual property.11  This jurisprudence has inadvertently 
created a notion of exhaustion as a fundamental principle of a distinct 
 
 5. Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Etablissements Consten, S.A.R.L. v. Comm’n, 1966 E.C.R. 
299, 333–43. 
 6. Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-Großmärkte 
GmbH & Co. KG, 1971 E.C.R. 487, 499–500. 
 7. Id. at 498–99; Etablissements Consten, 1966 E.C.R. at 338. 
 8. See infra Part IV. 
 9. EC Treaty art. 81. 
 10. Id. arts. 28–30. 
 11. For an application of the provisions on competition law, see Etablissements Consten, 
1966 E.C.R. 299.  See also Case 40/70, Sirena v. Eda, 1971 E.C.R. 69.  A variety of cases have 
also applied the provisions of Articles 28 through 30 EC (formerly Articles 30–36).  See Case 
9/93, IHT Internationale Heiztechnik GmbH v. Ideal-Standard GmbH, 1994 E.C.R. I-2789; 
Case 19/84, Pharmon BV v. Hoechst AG, 1985 E.C.R. 2281; Case 144/81, Keurkoop BV v. 
Nancy Kean Gifts BV, 1982 E.C.R. 2853; Case 187/80, Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV, 1981 
E.C.R. 2063; Joined Cases 55 & 57/80, Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH v. GEMA, 1981 
E.C.R. 147; Case 15/74, Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147. 
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“European intellectual property law.”12  The interpretation of this 
jurisprudence as establishing a rather rigid exhaustion rule has, thus, led 
to the reformulation of a European exhaustion principle in secondary 
legislation, which—in the case, for example, of directives—is then 
transformed into the body of national laws.  However, it remains an 
open question as to whether the ECJ truly established rules pertaining 
to intellectual property rights that inadvertently—or, at least, 
reflexively—have led to a higher degree of harmonization. 
This Article argues that this is not the case.  The exhaustion doctrine 
has been utilized as a pattern of argument by the ECJ to arrive at 
decisions that maintain the underlying aim of establishing a common 
market.  In this regard, this Article undertakes analyses of the status of 
the exhaustion rule as applied in different scenarios in order to identify 
the rule’s boundaries. 
The application of the exhaustion rule, as established by the ECJ, 
concerns the loss of control in the exercise of distribution or importation 
rights over subsequent acts of distribution.  The assessment of the 
exercise of intellectual property rights does not pose many difficulties.  
The ECJ, early on, purported that it was competent to scrutinize the 
exercise of intellectual property rights; the existence of intellectual 
property rights, however, remained a matter of national law and was not 
to be called into question.13  Although this distinction between the ECJ’s 
role with respect to issues of the exercise versus the existence of 
intellectual property rights met with substantial criticism for being too 
vague and tautological—indeed, a right that exists but cannot be freely 
exercised is a nudum ius—the systematic approach of the ECJ merely 
evidences that the conflict must be resolved under the existing language 
of Articles 28, 29 and 30 EC.14 
In order to frame the current debate regarding the status of the 
exhaustion doctrine, a brief historical outline of the ECJ’s treatment of 
territorial intellectual property rights is in order.  The first cases to 
 
 12. This is evidenced, in particular, by the inclusion of the exhaustion principle as 
applicable to physical goods placed in the market.  The restriction of the exhaustion principle 
to intra-Community trade has since been established in case law.  Case 479/04, Laserdisken 
ApS v. Kulturministeriet, 2006 ECJ CELEX LEXIS 447 (Sept. 12, 2006). 
 13. Initially, commentators expressed doubts as to whether the European Community 
was permitted to restrict the exercise of intellectual property rights given the general property 
safeguards under Article 295 EC (formerly Article 222).  See Friedrich-Karl Beier, Industrial 
Property and the Free Movement of Goods in the Internal European Market, 21 INT’L REV. 
INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 131 (1990). 
 14. Karen Banks & Giuliano Marenco, Intellectual Property and the Community Rules 
on Free Movement:  Discrimination Unearthed, 15 EUR. L. REV. 224 (1990). 
WESTKAMP ARTICLE  
2007] THE EUROPEAN EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE 295 
 
address the interaction between the EC Treaty provisions and the 
exercise of territorial intellectual property rights regarding the scope 
and effect of exclusive licensing agreements were resolved under the 
rules on competition law, in particular Article 81(1) EC (formerly 
Article 85(1)).15  The ECJ emphasized that license agreements 
containing territorial restriction clauses, which allowed the owners of 
the intellectual property rights to prevent reimports, violated the rules 
on competition.16  In the absence of an “agreement,” as required under 
Article 81 EC, the ECJ eventually began to apply the provision on the 
free movement of goods.  Article 28 EC (formerly Article 30) prohibits 
Member States from imposing “[q]uantitative restrictions on imports 
and all measures having equivalent effect.”17  The ECJ has consistently 
determined, for example, that attempts to exercise intellectual property 
rights on the strength of their territorial effect constituted such 
equivalent effect.18 
Article 30 EC (formerly Article 36) then allows a derogation from 
the principle of free movement of goods for the protection of industrial 
property.19  However, when first applied by the ECJ, the derogation for 
industrial property rights did not provide a blanket justification for 
every conceivable exercise of a national intellectual property right.  In 
the context of the derogation provided for under Article 30 EC, the ECJ 
generally instituted a balancing test—this balancing test then later 
provided the basis for the European exhaustion doctrine.  In order to 
demarcate the boundaries between a permitted exercise of an 
intellectual property right and the concerns of the internal market, the 
ECJ initially based its decisions on the distinction between the existence 
and exercise of intellectual property rights.  It held that, whereas the 
existence of rights remained unfettered by European Community law, 
the ECJ was competent under the EC Treaty to evaluate the exercise of 
such rights.20  Such “exercise” was, in turn, to be evaluated in 
accordance with the specific subject matter test; accordingly, 
derogations from the free movement of goods principle could only be 
 
 15. See EC Treaty art. 81(1). 
 16. Case 170/83, Hydrotherm Gerätebau GmbH v. Compact del Dott. Ing. Mario 
Andreoli, 1984 E.C.R. 2999; Case 58/80, Dansk Supermarked A/S v. A/S Imerco, 1981 E.C.R. 
191; Sirena, 1971 E.C.R. 69; Etablissements Consten, 1966 E.C.R. 299. 
 17. EC Treaty art. 28. 
 18. Joined Cases 55 & 57/80, Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH v. GEMA, 1981 E.C.R. 
147. 
 19. See EC Treaty art. 30. 
 20. See, e.g., Case 16/74, Centrafarm BV v. Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. 1183. 
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justified to the extent that the exercise of intellectual property rights 
was within the “essence” of the right,21 giving the ECJ an extremely 
flexible tool with which to overcome the adverse effects of territorial 
intellectual property rights and, thus, giving preference to the free 
movement of goods principle.  Hence, once the exercise of a national 
intellectual property right could not be considered to be necessary in 
order to maintain the specific subject matter or essence of the right, the 
right holder was no longer permitted to rely on it and, consequently, any 
further control was curtailed and deemed an improper exercise of such a 
right.22  Thereafter, the actual concept of exhaustion was first 
expressed—as far as can be discerned by this author—in the 1978 case 
of Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft 
Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH.23 
A.  Territorial Restrictions and Competition Law 
The two main block exemptions dealing with intellectual property 
rights—the Technology Transfer Regulation (TTR)24 and the Vertical 
Restraints Regulation (VRR)25—may indirectly affect the scope of the 
European exhaustion doctrine in that they permit certain degrees of 
territorial protection.  The existence of two divergent block exemptions, 
 
 21. See Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-
Großmärkte GmbH & Co. KG, 1971 E.C.R. 487.  Later cases also defined “specific subject 
matter” with regard to trademarks.  See Case 102/77, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. 
Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH, 1978 E.C.R. 1139 
(considering the essential function of the trademark to be the guarantee of origin to the 
consumer or ultimate user); Centrafarm, 1974 E.C.R. 1183 (securing the guarantee to market 
the product for the first time). 
 22. The issue of what constitutes a proper exercise of such a right is a matter of law for 
the ECJ to decide.  See Case 144/81, Keurkoop BV v. Nancy Kean Gifts BV, 1982 E.C.R. 
2853. 
 23. Hoffmann-La Roche, 1978 E.C.R. 1139.  The ECJ did not, however, introduce the 
exhaustion principle as a novel, conceptual approach; rather, it stated that the principle had 
already existed in case law related to Article 30 EC.  Id.  Subsequent case law then 
consistently and expressly reaffirmed the exhaustion rule.  See Case C-200/96, Metronome 
Musik GmbH v. Music Point Hokamp GmbH, 1998 E.C.R. I-1953; Case C-352/95, Phytheron 
Int’l SA v. Bourdon SA, 1997 E.C.R. I-1729; Joined Cases C-267 & 268/95, Merck & Co. v. 
Primecrown Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. I-6285; Joined Cases C-427, 429 & 436/93, Bristol-Myers 
Squibb v. Paranova A/S, 1996 E.C.R. I-3457; Case 9/93, IHT Internationale Heiztechnik 
GmbH v. Ideal-Standard GmbH, 1994 E.C.R. I-2789; Case 395/87, Ministère Pub. v. 
Tournier, 1989 E.C.R. 2521; Case 341/87, EMI Electrola GmbH v. Patricia Im, 1989 E.C.R. 
79; Case 35/87, Thetford Corp. v. Fiamma, 1988 E.C.R. 3585; Case 19/84, Pharmon BV v. 
Hoechst AG, 1985 E.C.R. 2281. 
 24. Commission Regulation 772/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 11 (EC) [hereinafter 2004 
TTR]. 
 25. Commission Regulation 2790/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 336) 21 (EC) [hereinafter VRR]. 
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which may potentially cover intellectual property provisions, leads to a 
high level of uncertainty in the application of the prevailing principles of 
law.  Under the new 2004 TTR, qualifying contractual restraints are no 
longer “white-listed,” as they had been under the 1996 TTR.26 
In regards to the issue of exhaustion, the 2004 TTR revises the 
language of the 1996 TTR, which had outlined the application of the 
provisions to circumstances including “a reservation by the licensor of 
the right to exercise the rights conferred by a patent to oppose the 
exploitation of the technology by the licensee outside the licensed 
territory.”27  This clause was outlined in Article 2(1)(14) of the 1996 
TTR and interpreted as an exclusion of exhaustion between licensor and 
licensee.28  If this were true, it might signify a shift in the notion of the 
European exhaustion doctrine. 
B.  Technology Transfer and Vertical Restraints 
The 1996 TTR permitted certain types of territorial restrictions.29  
The 1996 TTR, however, was repealed by the 2004 TTR,30 and the 2004 
TTR now follows a rather open regime in that it permits any territorial 
restriction provided that certain preconditions are met.31  The new 
regulation has a wider scope of application in that it covers software 
licenses as well as patent and know-how licensing agreements.32  Article 
81(1) EC33 is now inapplicable provided that the licensor does not enjoy 
a market share of more than thirty percent of the relevant product and 
technology market, or, in the case of competing undertakings, the 
 
 26. Compare 2004 TTR, supra note 24, with Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 10(1)–
(4), 1996 O.J. (L 31) 2 (EC) [hereinafter 1996 TTR]. 
 27. See 1996 TTR, supra note 26, art. 2(1)(14). 
 28. STEVEN D. ANDERMAN, EC COMPETITION LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS:  THE REGULATION OF INNOVATION 97 (1998); VALENTINE KORAH, AN 
INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE 298 (7th ed. 2000).  The 
2004 TTR apparently allows for territorial reservation for buyers.  See VALENTINE KORAH, 
AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE 287 (8th ed. 2004) 
[hereinafter KORAH, GUIDE]. 
 29. KORAH, supra note 28, at 298. 
 30. Compare 2004 TTR, supra note 24, with 1996 TTR, supra note 26. 
 31. The 1996 TTR only prohibited restrictions on passive sales.  It permitted a ban on 
the licensor from licensing third parties in the licensee’s territory and a ban on the licensor’s 
exploitation of the patent and know-how in that territory.  See 1996 TTR, supra note 26, art. 
1(1)(1)–(2).  Regarding open exclusive licenses, see Case 258/78, Nungesser KG v. Comm’n, 
1982 E.C.R. 2015.  See also 1996 TTR, supra note 26, art. 1(1)(4) (allowing certain territorial 
restrictions against competing licensees in territories within the common market). 
 32. 2004 TTR, supra note 24, art. 1(b). 
 33. EC Treaty art. 81(1). 
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parties do not have a combined market share of more than twenty 
percent of the relevant markets.34 
Article 4 of the 2004 TTR contains a “black list” of exceptions 
relating to certain types of market separations and prohibitions on 
subsequent innovations.35  A rigid market share approach, however, is 
prone to cause problems.  Determining the correct market share in the 
case of new technology markets is extremely intricate, and new 
technologies will easily lead to a significant market share—in the case of 
software, it may well be argued that new applications will render the 
licensor dominant even for the entire life of the product.  The effect will 
be to advise caution because a proper definition of markets for 
technological products or information markets is far from clear.36 
The TTR allows for closed, exclusive licenses.37  Accordingly, a 
licensee may be restricted from selling directly in to the licensor’s 
territory.38  Such a territory is not defined by borders, but encompasses 
all territories in which the licensor exploits the invention, which includes 
territories for which the licensor has appointed a wholesaler.39  Direct 
sales undertaken by a licensee in to any such territory would, therefore, 
constitute a breach of contract.  The 2004 TTR now distinguishes 
between competing and noncompeting undertakings.40  Where the 
undertaking parties are competing undertakings, they may enter into 
agreements under which the licensor restricts production to one 
territory.41  This provision does not appear to affect parallel imports, 
although one may undertake to advance a position that a prohibited 
 
 34. 2004 TTR, supra note 24, art. 3. 
 35. See id. art. 4.  Territorial restrictions do not fall within the hardcore restrictions.  Id. 
art. 4(1)(c)(iv). 
 36. Guido Westkamp, Balancing Database Sui Generis Right Protection with European 
Monopoly Control Under Article 82 E.C., 22 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 13, 16–17 (2001). 
 37. 2004 TTR, supra note 24. 
 38. 1996 TTR, supra note 26, art. 1. 
 39. Id. 
 40. 2004 TTR, supra note 24, art. 3.   
Where the undertakings . . . are competing undertakings, the exemption . . . shall 
apply [if] . . . the combined market share of the parties does not exceed 
20% . . . . Where the undertakings . . . are not competing undertakings, the 
exemption . . . shall apply [if] . . . the market share of each . . . does not exceed 
30% . . . .   
Id. 
 41. Id. art. 4(1)(c)(ii).  Provided that the licensed technology is produced within one or 
more technical fields of use or one or more product markets, the licensees cannot be 
restricted from producing for different purposes outside such territory.  Commission Notice, 
2004 O.J. (C 101) 2 [hereinafter TTR Guidelines]. 
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restriction of the licensee to produce in another territory gives rise to a 
right to market or distribute there.42  The reason for this is that outside 
the scope of a permitted production restriction—in other words, one 
that clearly sets out the conditions in relation to fields of use or product 
markets—intellectual property rights will be unenforceable and subject 
to scrutiny under Article 81(1) EC.43  With respect to the issue of 
consent, the ECJ took the view that the license, as such, constitutes 
consent within the meaning of the exhaustion rule; unless the restriction 
is exempt, any control right over the further distribution of a protected 
product is relinquished between licensor and licensee.44  The licensee 
can, however, be restricted from granting sublicenses outside such 
territory.45  The prerogative is not limited to the same restraints as an 
obligation on the licensee to only produce within defined technical fields 
of use or product markets.  It remains an open question as to whether 
this would affect a sublicense granted for the purpose of producing 
outside a field of use restriction or for a different product market.  The 
result, if such a reading were to be adhered to, would be absurd:  the 
licensor can only effectively restrain a licensee from expanding the 
contractual scope to “new” uses, but cannot prevent the same if the 
licensee has granted a sublicense. 
Under the VRR, a seller of products may impose restrictions on 
active sales in to territories reserved to third-party buyers and may also 
reserve territories to himself or herself.46  The VRR affects intellectual 
property rights only to the extent that they are ancillary provisions in 
relation to a distribution agreement.47  It is uncertain whether this 
provides for the cumulative application of the VRR in cases where a 
clause is not included under the TTR—by some commentators, this is 
 
 42. See 2004 TTR, supra note 24, art. 4. 
 43. Id.; see EC Treaty art. 81(1). 
 44. Case 102/77, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft 
Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH, 1978 E.C.R. 1139. 
 45. See TTR Guidelines, supra note 41, at 17. 
 46. Under Article 4(b) of the VRR, a seller may restrict  
the territory into which, or of the customers to whom, the buyer may sell the 
contract goods or services, except: 
the restriction of active sales into the exclusive territory or to an exclusive 
customer group reserved to the supplier or allocated by the supplier to another 
buyer, where such a restriction does not limit sales by the customers of the 
buyer. 
VRR, supra note 25, art. 4(b). 
 47. The term “ancillary” was interpreted to mean that the intellectual property right 
must not constitute the main object of the contract.  See Case T-112/99, Métropole Télévision 
v. Comm’n, 2001 E.C.R. II-2459. 
WESTKAMP ARTICLE  
300 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:2 
 
perceived as lex specialis.48  This requires a rather artificial distinction, 
especially in cases where the object of intellectual property protection in 
question is not entirely clear:  an agreement, for example, pertaining to 
the sale of a computer video game would be captured under the TTR, if 
the main object of the contract concerned distribution rather than 
licensing. 
II.  BLOCK EXEMPTIONS AND EXHAUSTION 
The traditional view of both the European Commission and the ECJ 
has been rather hostile toward the effects of territorial market 
partitioning.49  The view adopted by the ECJ has persistently referred to 
the overarching aim of establishing a common market.50  To that end, 
the ECJ has scrutinized licensing agreements under Article 81(1) EC 
and, if that provision was determined to be inapplicable, it has 
additionally analyzed the compatibility of the agreement with the 
principle of the free movement of goods.51  In all cases, the ECJ has 
relied on the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.52  In that sense, 
both competition rules and the free movement of goods principle are 
 
 48. VRR, supra note 25, recital (3). 
This category includes vertical agreements for the purchase or sale of goods or 
services where these agreements are concluded between non-competing 
undertakings, between certain competitors or by certain associations of retailers of 
goods; it also includes vertical agreements containing ancillary provisions on the 
assignment or use of intellectual property rights . . . . 
Id. 
 49. Commission Decision 76/29, 1976 O.J. (L 6) 8; Commission Decision 75/570, 1975 
O.J. (L 249) 27.  The ECJ has allowed open exclusive licenses.  Case 258/78, Nungesser KG v. 
Comm’n, 1982 E.C.R. 2015.  Likewise, the Patent Licensing Regulation only allowed 
nonexclusive and open exclusive licenses.  See Commission Regulation 2349/84, art. 1(1)(1)–
(5), 1984 O.J. (L 219) 15.  See generally KORAH, supra note 28, at 283. 
 50. Case 19/84, Pharmon BV v. Hoechst AG, 1985 E.C.R. 2281; Case 96/75, EMI 
Records Ltd. v. CBS Schallplatten GmbH, 1976 E.C.R. 913; Case 78/70, Deutsche 
Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-Großmärkte GmbH & Co. KG, 1971 E.C.R. 
487. 
 51. EC Treaty arts. 28–30, 81(1). 
 52. The ECJ established that Article 36 EC (now Article 30) does not restrict the scope 
of application of the competition provisions.  See Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Etablissements 
Consten, S.A.R.L. v. Comm’n, 1966 E.C.R. 299.  The ECJ later applied Article 36 EC, by way 
of analogy, to cases concerning Article 85 EC (now Article 81).  See Case 24/67, Parke, Davis 
& Co. v. Probel, 1968 E.C.R. 55.  Then, it directly applied Articles 30 through 36 EC (now 
Articles 28–30) to any exercise of intellectual property rights.  See Case 16/74, Centrafarm BV 
v. Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. 1183; Case 192/73, Van Zuylen Frères v. Hag AG, 1974 E.C.R. 
731; Deutsche Grammophon, 1971 E.C.R. 487; Case 40/70, Sirena v. Eda, 1971 E.C.R. 69. 
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taken into account in securing the overarching aim of establishing a 
common market. 
In apparent contrast to the traditional position on exhaustion, 
Article 2(1)(14) of the 1996 TTR indicated that sales contravening 
white-listed territorial restrictions could be prevented by the owner.53  
Consequently, exhaustion would not occur, and, in other words, the 
licensor would be permitted to prevent parallel imports.54  There is no 
guidance, however, under the 2004 TTR, which relies upon a market 
threshold approach, although, under Article 4, a territorial reservation 
by the licensor is still possible.55  The language of Article 2(1)(14) of the 
1996 TTR preserves for the patentee the right to “oppose” the 
exploitation outside the licensed territory,56 and the provision expressly 
refers to the “rights conferred by a patent.”57  Likewise, as outlined in 
Part I.B, the VRR includes provisions for territorial restrictions and 
may alternatively apply.58 
If the licensor is permitted to introduce territorial restrictions upon 
the licensee, the question still remains as to whether the licensor can 
enforce his or her intellectual property rights in cases where the 
licensee—or, in cases applying the VRR, the licensee-distributor—has 
put goods on the market despite a valid contractual restriction. 
A.  Scope of Application for Intellectual Property Rights 
Territorial restrictions on the resale of protected products may be 
exempt under either the VRR or the TTR.59  In relation to licenses for 
intellectual property rights, however, the scope of applicability and 
relationship between the TTR and VRR are not entirely clear.  The 
TTR applies to licenses of patents and similar subject matter that the 
European Commission deems to be within the realm of technology 
transfer.60  Such agreements cannot, however, be simultaneously exempt 
under the VRR.61 
 
 53. Article 2(1)(14) provides for “a reservation by the licensor of the right to exercise 
the rights conferred by a patent to oppose the exploitation of the technology by the licensee 
outside the licensed territory.”  1996 TTR, supra note 26, art. 2(1)(14). 
 54. See id. 
 55. See 2004 TTR, supra note 24, art. 4. 
 56. See 1996 TTR, supra note 26, art. 2(1)(14). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See VRR, supra note 25, art. 4(b). 
 59. See 2004 TTR, supra note 24; VRR; supra note 25. 
 60. See generally 2004 TTR, supra note 24. 
 61. See VRR, supra note 25, art. 2(1). 
WESTKAMP ARTICLE  
302 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:2 
 
A patentee may grant a license to manufacture and sell the patented 
invention in one territory, market the patent himself or herself, or 
appoint an exclusive dealer.  In each of these situations, different block 
exemptions apply.  One related problem that has since been addressed 
by the 2004 TTR is that the 1996 TTR afforded a lesser degree of 
protection depending on whether the legal relationship fell within the 
TTR or the VRR.62  It followed that an agreement that merely 
constituted a distribution contract was outside the scope of the TTR, 
even though it might have included a patent license.  Such a license is 
generally required because the act of selling constitutes the exercise of 
an exclusive right.  However, the contract may also simply contain an 
obligation under which the owner of the patent impliedly waives his or 
her right to exercise any propriety rights.  From Article 5 of the 2004 
TTR, it follows that a contract relating to the supply of a patented 
product is not covered under the TTR since the recitals state that the act 
of exploitation is the main goal for fostering new technologies.63  
Conversely, the VRR block exemption does not apply to contracts that 
have as their primary object the assignment or license of an intellectual 
property right.64 
The VRR does not apply to vertical agreements in which the 
respective provisions on intellectual property are not ancillary.65  
Because the VRR covers distribution agreements, it follows that a 
license introduced simply to allow the sale in the protected territory 
constitutes an ancillary provision.  The true scope of the term, however, 
still remains obscure.  Sole supply licenses are covered, although they 
were, likewise, excluded under the former TTR.66  Under the VRR, 
intellectual property licenses can be part of a vertical agreement as long 
as they do not constitute the primary object.67  The term is not defined in 
the VRR, but it may be asserted that such an objection would merely 
exclude those agreements to which the TTR applied anyway—that is, 
 
 62. For instance, a buyer could be given protection from direct sales by other buyers 
into his or her own territory under the VRR, but could not be protected from sales by a 
licensee, such as a manufacturer.  Compare VRR, supra note 25, art. 4(6), with 1996 TTR, 
supra note 26, art. 1(1)(5). 
 63. See 2004 TTR, supra note 24. 
 64. See VRR, supra note 25, art. 2(3). 
 65. See Commission Notice, 2000 O.J. (C 291) 1 [hereinafter VRR Guidelines]; see also 
VRR, supra note 25, recital (3). 
 66. 1996 TTR, supra note 26, art. 5. 
 67. VRR, supra note 25, arts. 2(3), (5). 
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licenses that are intended for exploitation or manufacture by the 
licensee.68 
Therefore, vertical agreements related to other intellectual property 
rights are covered, provided that the license remains ancillary so as to 
constitute a mere means to implement the contract for supply.69  Hence, 
under Article 2(3) of the VRR, a contract for the supply of patented 
goods for sale falls within the scope of the provisions.70  It also follows 
that these criteria must apply in relation to all other forms of intellectual 
property including, for example, copyright. 
A different approach to concluding whether certain intellectual 
property licenses in vertical agreements are covered by the VRR is to 
analyze the relationship between Article 2(1), which refers to all vertical 
agreements, and Article 2(3), which allows for the inclusion of ancillary 
intellectual property rights.71  The main issue here is whether Article 
2(3) excludes any other intellectual property agreements—that is, pure 
licenses that are not ancillary, but also include the characteristics 
mentioned in Article 2(1).72  One view is to permit certain intellectual 
property-related contracts to fall within the ambit of Article 2(1), thus 
invoking the application of the block exemption.73  The main concern 
thereby being to address the absence of a group exemption, particularly 
for franchising agreements and copyright licenses.74 
The contrary view, under which Article 2(3) is considered a lex 
specialis to Article 2(1), would force the conclusion that intellectual 
property licenses, as such, cannot be covered unless they are ancillary.75  
The solution to be found amongst these countervailing views is perhaps 
found in considering that it is almost impossible to draw a distinction 
between an ancillary and a non-ancillary provision relating to 
intellectual property rights if one disregards the intention of the parties 
and places emphasis instead solely on the fact that intellectual property 
rights have been licensed.  Under such an approach, a more balanced 
view may be taken:  the applicability of the VRR depends on the 
 
 68. KORAH, supra note 28, at 248. 
 69. See VRR Guidelines, supra note 65, at 9. 
 70. VRR, supra note 25, art. 2(3). 
 71. Id. arts. 2(1), (3). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. VALENTINE KORAH & DENIS O’SULLIVAN, DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENTS UNDER 
THE EC COMPETITION RULES 143 (2002). 
 75. Case 161/84, Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgallis, 
1986 E.C.R. 353; see KORAH & O’SULLIVAN, supra note 74, at 143. 
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proximity of a contract to a vertical supply agreement rather than to a 
license.  The TTR is, thus, lex specialis in relation to contracts regarding 
technology transfers because such contracts require a more generous 
scope of exemption.  The scope of restrictions in relation to territory, 
substance, and time exceed those of the VRR.  Licenses relating to 
other types of intellectual property, such as copyright, therefore, cannot 
be exempt under the VRR if the licenses go beyond the scope of the 
supply of other types of intellectual property, particularly if these 
contracts relate to the manufacture of the protected product.76 
But even if Article 2(3) of the VRR is not interpreted so as to 
restrict the entire scope of application to ancillary intellectual property 
provisions, a more flexible approach considering the reasons why the 
TTR does not apply to sole supply agreements still proves instructive.77  
The manufacturer must develop and invest in manufacturing devices.  
This investment makes it more difficult to penetrate the market.  In 
addition, because the TTR generally relates to new technology, it is 
more difficult for licensees to acquire a market altogether.78  The 
licensees not only have to bear investment costs, but also higher risks—
both risks that are normally not present in agreements relating to supply 
and resale.  For these agreements, however, the licensees and licensors 
can agree on rather extensive protectionist terms. 
In relation to copyrighted software, for example, it is suggested that 
a licensing agreement pertaining to distribution can be exempt under 
the VRR if the software license relates primarily to distribution of the 
physical software.  The licensee—for instance, a wholesaler—may then 
need a simple license to run the program based upon the right to 
temporarily make a reproduction in accordance with Article 4(a) of the 
European Software Directive.79  Hence, a distribution agreement that 
entails the right of the licensee to adapt or develop the software can fall 
under the VRR because the reproduction right granted has no 
individual economic significance in relation to the distribution.80  The 
same may be true in relation to contracts regarding the subsequent 
update of databases by licensees.81  Because the 2004 TTR now allows 
 
 76. See 2004 TTR, supra note 24; VRR; supra note 25. 
 77. See 1996 TTR, supra note 26, art. 10(15) (defining “ancillary provisions” as related 
to exploitation). 
 78. See id. 
 79. See Council Directive 91/250, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See id. 
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for the inclusion of software copyrights82 but not database copyrights or 
rights subsisting under Article 7 of the European Software Directive,83 
the final categorization of such contracts remains dubious and adds to 
the legal uncertainty regarding technology-related copyrights. 
Applying a more restrictive reading of the term “ancillary,” a 
different result will follow in relation to trademark licenses for 
franchising purposes.  If a franchisee does not have to bear substantial 
investment costs due to an established market reputation for the goods 
or services protected by the mark, one may deduce that the agreement 
is being concluded in relation to an existing market.  Here, the transfer 
of trademarks is a more substantial component of the agreement 
because without the established reputation, the parties would not have 
entered into the agreement.  Consequently, the trademark does not 
constitute an ancillary right, but rather is the very primary object.  This 
may transpire entirely differently in relation to registered marks, which 
have not yet acquired market reputation.  In short, the importance of 
reputation, as reflected in the respective trademark, will determine 
whether the VRR applies.84 
The 2004 TTR strictly adheres to market shares rather than relying 
on licensing clauses.85  An important distinction is made between 
competing and noncompeting undertakings.  In general, the TTR 
applies to competing undertakings if the combined market share does 
not exceed twenty percent of the relevant technology and product 
market; in the case of noncompeting undertakings, the threshold has 
been set at thirty percent.86  In effect, this approach forces a significant 
number of major undertakings back into the realm of Article 81(1) EC 
and will also affect small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which 
rely heavily upon the production of specialized products.87  The 
 
 82. See 2004 TTR, supra note 24. 
 83. See Council Directive 91/250, supra note 79, art. 7. 
 84. See generally VRR, supra note 25. 
 85. See 2004 TTR, supra note 24. 
 86. See id. art. 3. 
For technology transfer agreements between non-competitors it can be presumed 
that, where the individual share of the relevant markets accounted for by each of the 
parties does not exceed 30% and the agreements do not contain certain severely 
anti-competitive restraints, they generally lead to an improvement in production or 
distribution and allow consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits. 
Id. recital (11). 
 87. See EC Treaty art. 81(1).  It has already been argued that the “market share” 
approach—rather than an approach based on substantive terms—is counterproductive 
because industries relying on innovation will, to a large extent, be above the market share 
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combination of factual restrictions and the additional application of the 
provisions on the free movement of goods will, thus, produce an 
understanding of the exhaustion rhetoric that is directly applicable to 
further sales and supports a general understanding of the exhaustion 
principle as a formula for shaping and adjusting national intellectual 
property rights.  There will be grave effects:  even if territorial 
restrictions are permissive and are perceived to be pro-competitive 
because they allow for recoupment of investment costs, the violation of 
such clauses by a licensee or buyer will only constitute a breach of 
contract.  Such a position, however, is fallacious and factually 
contravenes the potentially pro-competitive effect of both technology 
transfer licenses and also certain other types of vertical restraints.  A 
licensee may be so attracted by actual price differences that he or she 
would undertake the economic risk of contractual damages in return for 
a higher profit by selling into reserved territories—such a scenario is not 
unlikely, especially in the pharmaceuticals sector where price fixation 
exists.88  It also, once again, gives rise to a high level of legal uncertainty. 
If an owner of an intellectual property right may restrict distribution 
as a matter of European Community law, a considerable difficulty arises 
in relation to determining the status of such restrictions as either 
absolute or contractual.  This issue is fundamentally identical to that 
which would arise under national intellectual property laws; national 
systems still have to employ some form of proportionality test for 
ensuring the free circulation of goods, and yet this must be balanced 
against the respective domestic notions of intellectual property and the 
proprietary effects of restrictive clauses.  This implies that jurisdictions 
may differ in respect to the effect of a licensor’s consent, which may or 
may not have an absolute effect, and, additionally, may also invoke a 
notion of national market freedom under which the impact of 
permissible restrictions on the free circulation of protected products 
may be curtailed.  One consequence of a more open system of 
restraints—territorial or otherwise—is that, because market partitioning 
is acceptable from a European Community law perspective, the extent 
 
because there are no real substitutes.  In addition, if the VRR applies to other forms of 
intellectual property rights as “ancillary”—for instance, database rights—a divergent 
treatment of the exhaustion rule will cause concern because it differentiates on the basis of an 
artificial discrimination regarding subject matter.  The problem has also surfaced in relation 
to franchising agreements, which predominantly rely upon trademark use, causing 
uncertainties as to whether such intellectual property rights are “ancillary.” 
 88. See, e.g., Pharmalicensing.com:  EMEA and the Marketing of Pharmaceuticals 
Across the European Union, http://pharmalicensing.com/articles/disp/994346010_3b448 
41a653f7 (last visited Apr. 10, 2007). 
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to which restrictive licensing clauses are permissible becomes a matter 
of national law. 
In regard to the issue of consent, neither the jurisprudence under 
Article 28 EC nor the respective block exemptions disclose whether a 
permissible but limited consent has absolute effect.89  This is 
unsurprising as both legal frameworks deal with potential distortions of 
the common market rather than establishing directly applicable norms 
for a scheme of European intellectual property licensing laws.  
Otherwise, the effect of permissible restrictions will become a matter of 
national law.  It then becomes primarily an issue of controlling both 
distribution channels and market levels, and this, in turn, depends on 
the scope of contractual freedom to allow the licensor to restrict 
subsequent sales into reserved territories with proprietary effect. 
According to the jurisprudence of the ECJ, such freedom does not 
exist because the European exhaustion rule does not pertain to the 
“first sale,” but rather pertains to any prospect of recouping an 
investment.90  This approach is based upon the reward theory, according 
to which even an acceptable territorial restriction does not protect 
against parallel imports.  However, this inference is hardly 
ascertainable.  It would, as a de minimis principle, axiomatically require 
the existence of a European exhaustion rule as a matter of intellectual 
property law, unequivocally demarcating the scope of contractual 
freedom under national law. 
B.  The Twofold Meaning of Consent 
Thus, the first conclusion relates to the interface between 
permissible restraints and proprietary consent.  Under both the 
jurisprudence on Articles 81(1) and 28 EC and the respective secondary 
legislation, “consent” refers to the act of putting products on the 
market.91  But the scope of that rule remains rather imprecise.  
Territorial restrictions based on the differences between national 
intellectual property systems were perceived as distorting the common 
market.92  For this reason, the ECJ has used the exhaustion rule so as to 
restrict control over subsequent sales on the basis of the act of 
 
 89. See EC Treaty art. 28; 2004 TTR, supra note 24; VRR, supra note 25. 
 90. Case 19/84, Pharmon BV v. Hoechst AG, 1985 E.C.R. 2281; Case 16/74, Centrafarm 
BV v. Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R. 1183. 
 91. See EC Treaty arts. 28, 81(1). 
 92. See Pharmon, 1985 E.C.R. 2281. 
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licensing.93  Such an approach appeared legitimate in that the level of 
integration was rather undeveloped.  Early on, the ECJ emphasized that 
consent was the cornerstone of its exhaustion concept, and it declined to 
recognize the occurrence of exhaustion in cases concerning non-
voluntary acts of distribution94 or in cases in which the goods were 
placed on the market outside the European Community.95 
Whereas the meaning of consent under most national laws related to 
putting products on the market, the ECJ operated with the 
understanding that any consent was sufficient.96  It referred to the 
specific subject matter of the intellectual property right in the context of 
Article 30 EC and concluded that the specific subject matter referred to 
the right of putting the product into circulation for the first time.97  Such 
an act would then exhaust the right with effect for the entire European 
Community.  It, thus, became irrelevant whether the agreement 
contained anti-competitive restrictions because it would be captured 
under Article 28 EC, which would necessarily supersede any right to 
prevent parallel imports.98  The key to this analysis is the emphasis 
placed on “consent,” which the ECJ interpreted so as to refer to the 
entire territory of the EC Treaty and which it equated with entering into 
licensing agreements, including compulsory licenses.99  This allowed for 
a step back from the more restrictive requirements under Article 81 EC 
and also invoked a legal rule under which entering into a license 
agreement, as such, was sufficient.  In turn, this interpretation 
developed into the understanding that every act of putting a product 
 
 93. See id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Case C-355/96, Silhouette Int’l Schmied GmbH & Co. KG v. Hartlauer 
Handelsgesellschaft mbH, 1998 E.C.R. I-4799. 
 96. See sources cited supra note 23. 
 97. See Joined Cases 55 & 57/80, Musik-Vertrieb Membran GmbH v. GEMA, 1981 
E.C.R. 147. 
 98. See EC Treaty art. 28. 
 99. See Joined Cases C-267 & 268/95, Merck & Co. v. Primecrown Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. I-
6285 (stating that the substance of a patent right was the exclusive right to put the invention 
on the market for the first time); Case 144/81, Keurkoop BV v. Nancy Kean Gifts BV, 1982 
E.C.R. 2853; Case 187/80, Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV, 1981 E.C.R. 2063 (stating that patent 
law does not give a right to monopoly profits and a patentee cannot prevent reimportation of 
goods previously marketed in another Member State even though the invention was not 
patentable there); Musik-Vertrieb, 1981 E.C.R. 147 (holding that there is no right to 
additional royalties for a copyright collecting society); Case 15/74, Centrafarm BV v. Sterling 
Drug Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147 (addressing the right to first put into circulation, either directly 
or by an authorized party, and the right to sue for infringement); see also Robert M. Merkin, 
The Interface Between Anti-Trust and Intellectual Property, 6 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 
377, 391 (1985). 
WESTKAMP ARTICLE  
2007] THE EUROPEAN EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE 309 
 
into circulation resulted in exhaustion, even when the place of first 
circulation was a country in which no rights existed or where the owner 
could not be rewarded, a scenario which was held to result in rendering 
intellectual property rights a nudum ius.100 
Territorial restrictions in licensing contracts cannot affect the 
occurrence of exhaustion as a matter of the proprietary scope of 
intellectual property rights.  Such an understanding, however, 
presupposes that the ECJ’s jurisprudence has established a true 
limitation on the exercise of national intellectual property rights.  
Consent, in this respect, was not employed as a predeterminative, 
normative rule, but rather constituted the principle aspect for resolving 
and guiding the proportionality test—mostly, but not necessarily, in 
favor of free circulation.101  If this is correct, the status of consent—and, 
subsequently, its effects upon exhaustion—may be analyzed more 
closely in light of the function of intellectual property rights and, more 
specifically, the scope of the licensor’s ability to bind his or her buyers 
and licensees. 
The current trend is to allow restraints for non-dominant firms.  This 
is true, at least, with respect to technology transfer rules and also under 
Article 81(1) EC.102  This appears to introduce a more flexible notion of 
consent in that the owner of intellectual property rights is permitted to 
restrict subsequent sales and may stipulate certain substantive 
restrictions.103  Therefore, the view may be taken that the meaning of 
consent as a matter of European Community law is identical to the 
scope of the license.  Hence, a license restricting the ability of the 
licensee to sell into reserved territories would not additionally be 
subject to a compatibility test under Article 30 EC.104  The licensor 
would be able to prevent exhaustion as a matter of his or her restricted 
consent, provided that the clause is exempt.  Here, the only problem is 
that the block exemptions do not contain express provisions on 
 
 100. See Clifford G. Miller, Magill:  Time to Abandon the “Specific Subject-Matter” 
Concept, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 415, 419 (1994). 
 101. The arguments raised in relation to a self-induced liability of the licensor by 
putting goods on the market are unconvincing because Article 30 EC relates to the restrictive 
practices under national law and is unconcerned with an individual’s behavior.  See, e.g., 
Merck, 1981 E.C.R. 2063; see also Folkmar Koenigs, Rechtsfolgen der Einheitlichen 
Europäischen Akte für den Gewerblichen Rechtsschutz, in  LOHN DER LEISTUNG UND 
RECHTSSICHERHEIT 267 (Manfred Bohlig ed., 1988). 
 102. Commission Decision 95/373, 1995 O.J. (L 221) 34. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See id. 
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exhaustion; following a more conventional approach, that might cause 
disparities insofar as the type of agreement is concerned.105 
The same is true for most national intellectual property systems, 
which allow for restrictions unless they exceed the scope of intellectual 
property rights granted as a matter of competition law.  Under 
European Community law, the issue of exhaustion is, therefore, 
undecided insofar as the block exemptions vary in their scope of 
application and their respective stances on exhaustion in cases of 
territorial restrictions. 
C.  Territorial Restrictions as Sector-Specific Exemptions on Exhaustion? 
As previously noted, Article 2(1)(14) of the 1996 TTR maintains the 
right of a patentee to oppose exploitation outside the licensed 
territory.106  The provision is interpreted so as to simultaneously imply 
that exhaustion does not occur.107  Territorial restrictions will then 
enable the licensor to bind third parties because the necessary consent is 
absent—that is, they will have an absolute effect.  As a matter of law, 
such restrictions would also, therefore, not violate Article 28 EC. 
Conversely, in Europe, the exhaustion rule would generally apply 
under Article 28 EC with direct effect upon national intellectual 
property rights; in that sense, it has proprietary effect.  It follows that 
the effect rests in restricting the scope of intellectual property rights in 
order to generally exclude any further control over subsequent sales.  
Such a position rests upon the traditional perception of intellectual 
property licenses as obstacles for establishing the common market; 
given this perception, the ECJ has exhibited subsequent hostility toward 
territorial restrictions. 
1.  Market Freedom and Differentiation of Market Levels 
Under the former Patent Licensing Regulation,108 the view was taken 
that the first act of licensing exhausts the right with effect for the entire 
territory.109  If it were to apply to subsequent acts, the owner would be 
able to control subsequent sales and impose diverging levels of 
protection.110  If it applied at the stage where the licensed product 
 
 105. See supra Part II.A. 
 106. 1996 TTR, supra note 26, art. 2(1)(14). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Commission Regulation 2349/84, supra note 49. 
 109. See id. 
 110. James S. Venit, In the Wake of Windsurfing:  Patent Licensing in the Common 
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reaches the consumer, then sales prior to this could be controlled by 
way of national patent laws.  It should be noted, however, that a striking 
distinction exists in European case law that appears to apply to the 
entirety of intellectual property rights—that is, the right to control all 
sales.  Under national patent and copyright laws, exhaustion occurs only 
once the product or copy has actually been put into circulation, and the 
effect only applies to these specific copies; under European Community 
laws, exhaustion occurs without any objective circulation at the time at 
which the contract is entered.111  This stance is, thus, much more 
restrictive, and it is suggested that the rigidity imposed by the ECJ 
reiterates the correctness of the functional approach.112  In fact, by 
insisting on exhaustion through the act of licensing, the ECJ has 
adopted a view that is hardly reconcilable with the function of the 
exhaustion rule under national law.  Thus, it remains a basic blueprint 
that serves to achieve a balance between the core, untouchable subject 
matter and the consequences of exercising intellectual property rights in 
relation to the common market.  Consequentially, if the exhaustion rule 
simply exists as a collision clause, its impact will be a matter of the 
applicable national laws in relation to the licensing contract. 
2.  Potential Disparities Between Block Exemptions 
The second problem this will induce is a potentially artificial 
exemption from exhaustion under different block exemptions.  Hence, 
exhaustion can only be prevented under the TTR as a sector-specific 
exception in expressly referring to a continued sole exploitation right in 
reserved territories, but not, hypothetically, under the VRR.113 
The exhaustion rule, therefore, will apply since the clause effects a 
barrier to trade within the meaning of Article 28 EC if the licensor 
evokes his or her rights in order to introduce export bans.114  In such a 
case, there is no opportunity to invoke national patent rights to stop 
direct sales.115  This was the position set forth under the Patent Licensing 
 
Market, in 1986 FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE 517, 528–29 (B. Hawk ed., 1987). 
 111. See Case 19/84, Pharmon BV v. Hoechst AG, 1985 E.C.R. 2281. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See 2004 TTR, supra note 24; VRR, supra note 25. 
 114. Case 258/78, Nungesser KG v. Comm’n, 1982 E.C.R. 2015. 
 115. Cf. ANDERMAN, supra note 28, at 98 (stating that even though a clause may be 
caught under Article 81(1) EC, the licensor may still be able to rely on national patent rights).  
The correct view is to treat the agreement in accordance with Article 81(1) EC, whereas the 
question of exhaustion in cases of illegitimate restrictions—for example, an export ban 
imposed between individual licensees—should be treated under Articles 28 through 30 EC. 
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Regulation, under which a territorial restriction would have no effect on 
subsequent sales into reserved territories;116 in other words, the 
contractual clause—albeit, enforceable against the licensee—had no 
absolute proprietary effect. 
As previously noted, this appears to have changed under the 1996 
TTR, where Article 2(1)(14) upheld the licensors’ right to oppose 
subsequent sales within reserved territories with absolute effect,117 
although the TTR does not mention the exhaustion principle.118  The 
2004 TTR, likewise, does not mention exhaustion, but it does permit any 
territorial restriction provided that the market thresholds are not 
exceeded.119  If the view were to be taken that the respective block 
exemptions deal with the exhaustion issue, this would have a number of 
consequences.  First, exhaustion would be a result of the applicability of 
either the TTR or VRR.  The consequences now are apparently less 
grave than they would have been under the 1996 TTR, which prohibited 
restrictions on sales into territories reserved to other licensees;120 the 
VRR now allows such territorial protection for buyers.121  Hence, in 
cases of mixed supply and licensing agreement structures, if a buyer sold 
in a licensee’s territory, the owner of the intellectual property right 
would not be able to prevent further sales because Article 2(1)(14) of 
the 1996 TTR would be inapplicable in prohibiting such territorial 
protections.122  Therefore, exhaustion would have occurred once the 
goods had been supplied from the country of export, and the clause 
would be captured under Article 81(1) EC.123  If he or she sold into 
another buyer’s territory, such territorial protection would be 
permissive under the VRR provided that the intellectual property right 
in question is ‘ancillary’ to the main contract; however, because the 
clause is exempt under the VRR—which includes no provision similar 
to Article 2(1)(14) of the 1996 TTR—the general rules of exhaustion 
would apply.  This leads to a potential inconsistency between both the 
provisions of the TTR and VRR. 
 
 116. See ANDERMAN, supra note 28, at 97; Venit, supra note 110, at 527. 
 117. See ANDERMAN, supra note 28, at 99; KORAH, supra note 28, at 298. 
 118. See 1996 TTR, supra note 26, art. 2(1)(14). 
 119. See TTR 2004, supra note 24, art. 4. 
 120. See 1996 TTR, supra note 26. 
 121. See VRR, supra note 25, recital (3). 
 122. As has been discussed, Article 2(1)(14) of the 1996 TTR only allowed a reservation 
of the licensor of his or her right conferred by a patent to oppose the exploitation by a 
licensee, not by a buyer of a protected product.  1996 TTR, supra note 26, art. 2(1)(14). 
 123. See EC Treaty art. 81(1). 
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Territorial restrictions within the ambit of the TTR would, therefore, 
prevent exhaustion between licensors and licensees, which implies that 
third parties may be bound under the terms of contracts based on 
domestic intellectual property rights.  It is obvious that a licensee cannot 
reimport into a licensor’s territory; the ensuing question, however, is 
whether or not the licensor can also prevent further sales by third 
parties.  This depends on whether the respective clause is proprietary—
that is, whether the control right over subsequent acts of distribution 
can be enforced on the basis of national intellectual property rights.124 
If the TTR permits reservations of territories, subsequent acts of 
distribution at different market levels might violate Article 28 EC, 
despite being exempt from competition control.  The answer 
predominantly depends upon the relationship between Articles 81 and 
28 EC and the status of the exhaustion rule under the principle of the 
free movement of goods.125  If Articles 81 and 28 EC are complementary 
in seeking to ensure a balance between pro-competitive restrictions and 
the free movement of goods, one may conclude either that Article 28 
EC is inapplicable126 or that the restriction can be justified under Article 
30 EC, precisely because it aims to uphold the effect of intellectual 
property rights as an incentive. 
In its traditional judicature, the ECJ has consistently determined to 
permit the inventor the chance of reward,127 rather than gain a true 
profit;128 such a position, however, was informed by the “first licensing” 
doctrine, which necessarily rendered both concepts consistent in 
prohibiting territorial restraints.  Whether the TTR allows for the 
inference that European Community law may now be interpreted more 
extensively as enabling the licensor to recoup reward beyond the mere 
act of licensing is an open question.129  A view rejecting the notion of a 
 
 124. See ANDERMAN, supra note 28, at 98. 
 125. See infra Part III.A. 
 126. See infra Part IV.A. 
 127. Case 15/74, Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147. 
 128. See Case 187/80, Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV, 1981 E.C.R. 2063 (applying 
exhaustion even regardless of a factual chance of reward); Centrafarm, 1974 E.C.R. 1147; see 
also JÖRG REINBOTHE & SILKE VON LEWINSKI, THE EC DIRECTIVE ON RENTAL AND 
LENDING RIGHTS AND ON PIRACY 17 (1993) (asserting that consent refers to putting the 
work on the market for the first time). 
 129. Case 19/84, Pharmon BV v. Hoechst AG, 1985 E.C.R. 2281 (suggesting that in 
cases of direct sales, exhaustion should apply, thereby favoring free circulation of goods over 
territorial restrictions); see also Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. 
Metro-SB-Großmärkte GmbH & Co. KG, 1971 E.C.R. 487 (applying a similar result to 
copyright). 
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European license as a matter of competition policy130 would signify that 
the TTR embraces a proprietary concept, allowing for inferences to be 
drawn as to the scope of intellectual property rights. 
Therefore, it appears that exhaustion does not occur, at least as far 
as European Community law is concerned with regard to clauses falling 
within the TTR.  In general, this viewpoint is difficult to reconcile with 
the conceptual framework and interface between competition law and 
the rules related to the free movement of goods.  Within national legal 
frameworks, competition law is concerned with restrictions stemming 
from intellectual property monopolies.  The normative assertion of 
competition law is not concerned with providing rules of a proprietary 
character.  Initially, it cannot be asserted whether exhaustion occurs as a 
matter of European Community competition law.  In addition, such an 
interpretation would give rise to uncertainties because it would depend 
on whether the applicable block exemption contained a provision 
expressly allowing for a territorial restriction as a matter of copyright or 
patent law, which would restrict the proprietary nature of territorial 
restrictions to those block exemptions primarily concerned with 
intellectual property licenses. 
Restrictions falling within the VRR, then, ostensibly do not give rise 
to exhaustion and might be included under Article 28 EC.  But, here, it 
remains open to consideration as to the following:  (1) at which market 
level exhaustion will occur, and (2) whether the supplier of protected 
goods can still control further sales on the basis of national intellectual 
property rights.  The prior jurisprudence of the ECJ is unhelpful; in 
most cases the ECJ held that initial consent was decisive, but the 
relevant case law did not deal with a situation in which an intellectual 
property right ancillary to a distribution agreement was invoked so as to 
prevent further sales.  For licenses not covered by a block exemption 
but exempt under Article 81(1) EC, the same would presumably apply. 
On the other hand, it is apparent that the notion of exhaustion and 
its doctrinal foundation as a matter of market freedom remains 
pertinent, but the extent to which it affects licenses is now debatable.  
This is because its doctrinal status is unclear.  There are principally two 
positions taken up in approaching this debate.  First, one may take the 
view that the principle of free movement of goods is still intact, and, 
 
 130. Commission Decision 95/373, supra note 102; see Joined Cases 55 & 57/80, Musik-
Vertrieb Membran GmbH v. GEMA, 1981 E.C.R. 147 (suggesting that the ability to exploit 
was a precondition for exhaustion); see also Case T-504/93, Tiercé Ladbroke v. Comm’n, 1997 
E.C.R. II-923. 
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therefore, the scope of licenses and their ability to bind third parties is 
irrelevant.  This first view is based upon earlier jurisprudence, but 
presumes that a European exhaustion rule truly exists as a matter of 
intellectual property law.  This position will be analyzed and ultimately 
rejected in Part III.  The second view is to identify parameters to restrict 
the exercise of intellectual property rights, rather than as a matter of 
overcoming territorial restrictions.  As will be discussed, this causes a 
number of problems due to the differences among national intellectual 
property laws in regard to the more delicate issues of divisibility of 
economic rights and the character of licenses as being proprietary.131 
III.  THE MYTH OF EUROPEAN EXHAUSTION:  THE DOCTRINAL 
STATUS OF ARTICLE 30 EC IN COMPETITION LAW 
In permitting territorial restraints as a matter of European 
Community competition law, the question, thus, arises as to the 
underlying rationale and continued applicability and potential of the 
exhaustion principle.  The central issue is whether the exhaustion rule 
has binding effect in that, on the basis of the overriding free movement 
of goods principle, it eradicates restrictions in licensing agreements that 
permit some territorial protection.  One way to address the issue is to 
consider the status of the exhaustion rule as part of national intellectual 
property laws implemented as a consequence of European Community 
legislation; here, in particular, the arguments may be raised in relation 
to exhaustion with respect to cases of online uses. 
Currently, the statutory regulation of distribution systems of 
protected articles is tripartite.  Regulation of distribution systems is 
permissible under the relevant block exemptions, but the question has 
arisen as to whether the VRR and TTR deal with exhaustion in 
different ways.  Such an approach should be rejected because it would 
result in a divergent treatment of the exhaustion principle and would 
cause legal uncertainty.  It is submitted, therefore, that the correct view 
is to treat the exhaustion question, not as an issue exclusively resolved 
under the provisions of the TTR, but as a more fundamental issue of 
proportionality.  The correct interpretation of Article 2(1)(14) of the 
1996 TTR and its successor, therefore, is that it merely deals with the 
validity of a contractual restriction rather than conferring powers on the 
basis of national intellectual property rights.  This perception, as such, 
permits a more functional approach to the relationship between 
 
131. See infra Part IV.A. 
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competition law and market freedom, and it need not be restricted to 
territorial restraints. 
Thus, the issue of exhaustion turns in to the issue of the binding 
effect of that jurisprudence on national intellectual property rights.  
Here, the second and third regulatory layers need to be analyzed.  This 
pertains to the dogmatic status of the exhaustion rule under Article 30 
EC, which leads to the more general issue of the interface of 
competition rules and the free movement of goods. 
A.  Construction of Intellectual Property Under Article 30 EC:  A Matter 
of Intellectual Property Regulation? 
There is ample evidence to suggest that the interpretation of the 
principle of the free movement of goods, as applied to the exercise of 
intellectual property rights, is not concerned with a proprietary notion 
but is exclusively informed by the need to reconcile the conflict between 
territoriality and market freedom. 
Under a more functional approach, the argument that exhaustion 
cannot occur within the context of Articles 28 through 30 EC may be 
based on the view that both provisions on competition control and the 
free movement of goods are complementary in the sense that both sets 
of rules exist to achieve the goal of a common market, as set forth in 
Article 2 EC.132  Article 30 EC then primarily serves as a collision clause 
applied flexibly.133  This view develops from the cumulation theory, as 
applied with respect to the interface between competition and market 
freedom rules.  Accordingly, contractual territorial restrictions violate 
Article 28 EC only insofar as they constitute a discriminatory 
restriction.134 
In that sense, Article 30 EC establishes a general collision clause 
between a justifiable and a non-justifiable exercise of intellectual 
property rights.  Thus, the exhaustion rule is merely an instrument to 
achieve a result that would otherwise provoke a separation of the 
 
 132. See Deutsche Grammophon, 1971 E.C.R. 487; Case 24/67, Parke, Davis & Co. v. 
Probel, 1968 E.C.R. 55; Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Etablissements Consten, S.A.R.L. v. 
Comm’n, 1966 E.C.R. 299.  Some commentators have suggested that permitted licensing 
clauses under Article 81(3) EC should not additionally be subjected to Articles 28 through 30 
EC.  See LAURENCE W. GORMLEY, PROHIBITING RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITHIN THE 
EEC 20–21, 285 (1985); Martin Schödermeier, Die Ernte der “Maissaaat”: Einige 
Anmerkungen zum Verhältnis von Art. 30 und 85 EWG-Vertrag, 1987 GEWERBLICHER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT INTERNATIONALER [GRUR INT.] 85. 
 133. See EC Treaty art. 30. 
 134. See id. art. 28. 
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internal market.  It can be used to overcome the fact that the EC Treaty 
does not affect the property rights guaranteed by the national legislation 
of Member States.135  In that sense, it provides a line of argument based 
on a comparison between national laws and serves as a watershed by 
invoking the specific subject matter test, a test primarily used to 
overcome the intricacies of the territoriality principle in relation to the 
grant of a patent.  This view is, for instance, supported by the rhetoric 
that the ECJ used in trademark cases.  In cases concerning the 
repackaging of goods protected by trademarks, the ECJ has emphasized 
the potentially pro-competitive effects of prohibitions on resales 
because the act of repackaging conflicts with the original function of a 
trademark.136  The ECJ, thereby, refers to the function of intellectual 
property rights in specific circumstances, which allows the trademark 
owner to oppose parallel imports.137  In the context of its Article 30 EC 
analysis, the ECJ has established reasons for a justification of 
prohibitions on parallel imports and, thus, deviates from its own 
exhaustion jurisprudence. 
The resulting jurisprudence created a need for a line of argument to 
allow for sound statutory interpretation and to lend doctrinal credibility 
to the existing reasoning promulgating the principle of free movement 
of goods.  Article 30 EC expressly provides a justification on the basis of 
safeguarding national industrial property rights.138  The exhaustion 
 
 135. Id. art. 222. 
 136. In relation to trademarks, the ECJ has developed the concept of the essential 
function, which subsequently found its way into the Trade Mark Regulation.  See Case C-
273/00, Sieckmann v. Deutsches Patent, 2002 E.C.R. I-11737 (stating that “the essential 
function of a trade mark is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the marked product or 
service to the consumer or end-user by enabling him . . . to distinguish that product or service 
from others”).  Article 7 of the Trade Marks Approximation Directive establishes the 
principle of “exhaustion of the rights conferred by a trade mark.”  Council Directive 89/104, 
art. 7, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1. 
1.  The trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to 
goods which have been put on the market in the Community under that trade mark 
by the proprietor or with his consent. 
2.  Paragraph 1 shall not apply where there exist legitimate reasons for the 
proprietor to oppose further commercialization of the goods, especially where the 
condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put on the 
market. 
Id. 
 137. Franz Christof Urlesberger, “Legitimate Reasons” for the Proprietor of a Trade 
Mark Registered in the EU to Oppose Further Dealings in the Goods After They Have Been 
Put on the Market for the First Time, 36 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1195 (1999). 
138. EC Treaty art. 30. 
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principle, as established in national laws related to distribution rights, 
provided a welcome device to inform the analysis as it existed in most 
Member States, and, in turn, it allowed for judicature based upon a 
comparative analysis of intellectual property laws combined with the 
aim of abolishing national boundaries.  This was first based upon the 
existence and exercise dichotomy and later on the specific subject 
matter test.  Both tests were necessary as normative elements under 
Article 30 EC.  It also enabled the ECJ to overcome arguments 
purporting a cumulative application of the rules on restrictive practices 
contravening Article 81 EC and the rules on the free movement of 
goods.139 
Under the cumulation theory, the ECJ would have had to prove a 
disguised restriction or discrimination, largely enabling parallel imports.  
National intellectual property rights can be exercised without such 
consequences under Article 81 EC,140 and it would have forced the ECJ 
to rely upon the more restrictive provisions of Article 81 EC.141  Hence, 
the exhaustion rule, as applied in the context of Article 30 EC, is one—
albeit decisive—element in the balancing of interests analysis, but it is 
not a jurisprudential limitation on property rights as such.  The 
subsequent formulation of a specific subject matter test serves as a 
device to channel the legal rhetoric into a sound and flexible balancing 
of interests.  This approach reveals the dogmatic function of Article 30 
EC as a collision clause  when applied to conflicts between territorial 
intellectual property rights and market freedom.  This test was informed 
by the almost unanimous will to give preference to market freedom, 
which is clearly evident in decisions focusing on actual—and later, 
hypothetical—reward and the subsequent reliance upon the sheer act of 
placing goods in the market.  These arguments, albeit clad in a rhetoric 
pertaining to the subject matter of an intellectual property right, 
primarily reflect policy driven arguments and explain the shift toward 
emphasizing the consent issue as a decisive element for limiting the 
exercise of distribution rights. 
It follows that the status of intellectual property exhaustion is 
undecided in regard to permissible restrictions.  Thereby, the influence 
of Article 30 EC on national intellectual property rights appears 
extremely limited.  The inference of a Community-wide exhaustion 
 
 139. See Case 15/74, Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147. 
 140. F.A. Mann, Industrial Property and the E.E.C.Treaty, 24 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 31, 34 
(1975). 
 141. See GORMLEY, supra note 132, at 233; Beier, supra note 13. 
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“principle” is workable as long as it can be dovetailed with a general 
perception that the exercise of intellectual property rights as a means to 
redraw national boundaries is inconsistent with the common market 
aim; further, it should apply only to the extent that rules regarding 
restrictive licensing clauses are perceived as cumulatively violating the 
competition and free movement of goods provisions.142 
B.  Implemented European Intellectual Property Regulation:  The 
Applicability of Article 28 EC and Permissible Restraints 
Secondary legislation in Europe has been heavily influenced by the 
jurisprudence on exhaustion, and this has certainly led to an 
understanding of the exhaustion rule as a core principle of harmonized 
intellectual property law.  In the case of implemented exhaustion rules, 
Member States are required to interpret such norms in accordance with 
European Community legislation.  One interpretation is that a 
transposed exhaustion rule has enshrined the European first sale 
doctrine as a proprietary limitation on the distribution right.  Such a 
reading has the effect of suggesting that exhaustion occurs, not as a 
matter of the overriding principle of free movement of goods, but  as a 
limitation of national rights.  Permissible restrictions would be a matter 
of competition law only, and their effect would certainly not be absolute 
so as to enable further control over subsequent market levels. 
However, a closer look at national systems reveals that such an 
interpretation is unsound.  Although it is clear that exhaustion occurs at 
the point where goods reach the consumer market, national laws still 
have discrepancies in relation to the scope of control and the question of 
whether such control can bind third parties.143  This problem has never 
been addressed precisely because the European Commission relies upon 
a seemingly rigid manifestation of the traditional ECJ jurisprudence.  
The effect is that (1) restrictions that allow such control necessarily go 
beyond the scope of the limited intellectual property; (2) such clauses 
prima facie violate competition law and may only be exceptionally 
exempt; and (3) regardless of the permissibility of the clause,  the free 
movement principle will supersede—that is, there is no allowance for a 
 
 142. This is because a violation of Article 81 EC would, according to the jurisprudence 
of the ECJ, simultaneously violate Article 28 EC.  Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Etablissements 
Consten, S.A.R.L. v. Comm’n, 1966 E.C.R. 299.  The ECJ held that Article 30 EC cannot 
restrict the application of Article 81 EC.  Id.  Subsequently, the ECJ emphasized that Article 
30 EC was applicable by way of analogy, but it referred to the occurrence of exhaustion.  See 
Case 24/67, Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel, 1968 E.C.R. 55, 61. 
 143. See infra Part IV. 
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cumulative and dovetailed application of both sets of rules.  In short, 
arguments based on a dynamic balancing of interests are foreclosed. 
One revelation of this position is that it consistently equates acts of 
distribution with physical goods.  The questionability of this position 
becomes apparent in a different context:  the relationship of the free 
movement of goods and the free provision of services.  The main issue 
regarding the exhaustion principle is whether the jurisprudence, beyond 
the treatment of the territoriality aspects, can be interpreted at all to 
evoke an understanding of efforts to harmonize intellectual property 
rights.  This issue has arisen with respect to the scope of exhaustion in 
relation to certain online uses.  The European Commission has referred 
to the jurisprudence under Article 28 EC and concluded that, because 
online services do not constitutes goods but rather services,144 exhaustion 
cannot occur.145  The distinction between goods and services used to 
justify this conclusion remains unclear; simply, European economies 
experience an increasing overlap between the second and third sector.  
The ECJ showed clearly that mutual exclusivity was not warranted, but 
it was prepared to test a violation against both fundamental principles in 
a case concerning television advertisements targeted at children.146  In 
short, the ECJ applied a discreet proportionality test.147  In conclusion, 
very little of the ECJ’s judicature allows for an argument based upon 
the exclusion of exhaustion.  Practically, this may allow for an enlarged 
scope for national laws to invoke the exhaustion principle, but it 
certainly casts doubt upon the availability of invoking a general 
exhaustion rule under Article 28 EC. 
The reason for this exclusion is threefold.  The first is closely 
intertwined with the structure of Article 49 EC and the preceding 
provisions dealing with the freedom to provide services as compared to 
Article 28 EC.  Article 49 EC does not contain a provision allowing for 
 
 144. This notion may also be inferred from the Directive on Electronic Commerce, 
which refers to services as a matter of regulating online services.  See Council Directive 
2000/31, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Joined Cases C-34, 35 & 36/95, Konsumentombudsmannen v. De Agostini 
(Svenska) Förlag AB, 1997 E.C.R. I-3843.  The goods to be marketed were collectable parts 
for a children’s reference book on dinosaurs produced by an Italian manufacturer.  The 
advertisements were broadcast from the United Kingdom into, inter alia, Sweden, where 
media law prohibits advertisements targeted at children.  Although the impact of the 
prohibition was assessed in relation to both fundamental principles, the justification of the 
Swedish media law provision was not addressed apart from the provisions of Articles 28 
through 30 EC and Article 49 EC.  See id. 
 147. See supra note 146. 
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a justification.148  Compared to Article 30 EC, the missing link is that the 
escape route toward a proportionality test is absent.149  This means that 
the absence of an applicable exhaustion rule as an element allowing the 
ECJ to strike a balance—or indeed to invoke other principles, which 
may operate to restrict national intellectual property rights—is not 
open.150  Even if the systematic escape route under Article 30 EC is 
obstructed because Article 28 EC does not apply, the ECJ has already 
clarified that the freedom to provide services does not apply without 
any restriction.151  Rather, it has upheld that national restrictions, which 
are proportional, can justify a derogation from Article 49 EC, which, in 
truth, reveals an application of a proportionality test by way of analogy 
to Article 30 EC.  Expressly, these include the protection of intellectual 
property.152  Hence, based on current judicature, one may assert that 
Article 49 EC may, indeed, be limited by the application of inherent 
intellectual property restrictions, which might as well include the 
application of the exhaustion rule under national law; importantly, this 
conclusion casts doubt upon the viability of a rigid exhaustion rule in 
cases concerning permissible restraints.  Secondly, with respect to 
copyright law, the European Commission has relied upon the decision 
in Coditel v. Ciné Vog Films153 concerning a very specific issue in relation 
to public performance rights, which is ultimately unhelpful for purposes 
of arguing in favor of an overall exclusion in relation to a vague notion 
of online services.  And thirdly, to the extent that the European 
Commission relies upon the definition of “online services” outlined in 
the Directive on Electronic Commerce, it disregards the fact that, again, 
the definition of “services” functions so as to focus the restrictions for 
typical Internet services across the board, rather than serving as a role 
model for categorizing exclusive rights and their limitations in 
copyright.154 
The division between goods and services under the EC Treaty, 
therefore, gives no guidance as to the extent to which intellectual 
 
 148. See EC Treaty arts. 28, 49. 
 149. See Herman Cohen Jehoram & Kamiel Mortelmans, Zur “Magill”—Entscheidung 
des Europäischen Gerichtshofs, 1997 GRUR INT. 11, 14. 
 150. Konsumentombudsmannen, 1997 E.C.R. I-3843. 
 151. Id.; see also EC Treaty art. 30. 
 152. See Case C-384/93, Alpine Invs. BV v. Minister van Financien, 1995 E.C.R. I-1141; 
Case C-288/89, Stichting Collectieve Antennevoorziening Gouda v. Commissariaat voor de 
Media, 1991 E.C.R. I-4007, para. 11; Case C-76/90, Säger v. Dennemeyer & Co., 1991 E.C.R. 
I-4221. 
 153. Case 62/79, Coditel v. Ciné Vog Films (Coditel I), 1980 E.C.R. 881. 
 154. See Council Directive 2000/31, supra note 144. 
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property rights can be exercised or limited as a matter of national law.  
As far as the scope of the exhaustion rule in relation to online services is 
concerned, the negation of exhaustion merely follows from the fact that 
a limitation based upon exhaustion could not be argued because the 
classification as service systematically forecloses that line of reasoning.  
This shows that the regulatory scope of fundamental freedoms and the 
acceptable scope of national intellectual property rights are not 
identical.  It remains an issue of proportionality.  By applying this more 
accommodating proportionality assessment, the ECJ recognizes the 
increasing convergence of industrial sectors and the need to restructure 
the normative provisions under primary European Community laws.155  
The jurisprudence does not articulate any terminology that can be 
understood as autonomously defining the scope of intellectual property 
rights.  Hence, inasmuch as the interpretation of Article 30 EC is subject 
to an assessment of proportionality, any interpretation of national 
norms implementing the European exhaustion rule on that basis results 
in circular argumentation. 
It necessarily follows that the traditional judicature regarding Article 
30 EC, likewise, does not permit an inference in relation to an 
understanding of a proprietary exhaustion rule above and beyond the 
final act of putting an article on the consumer market. 
IV.  THE EFFECTS OF HARMONIZING TERRITORIAL RESTRAINTS:  THE 
BLIND SPOTS 
The scope of permissible control can neither safely be deduced from 
the rule on the free movement of goods, nor can it be immediately 
inferred from competition law.  What is clear is that exhaustion will 
occur once an article is placed on the consumer market;156 yet, the 
interface between exhaustion and permissible restraints remains 
dubious as far as restrictions vis-à-vis commercial licenses are 
concerned. 
Dogmatically, therefore, territorial and other restrictions permitting 
exclusivity, which are necessary to maintain the function of an 
intellectual property right, supersede the exhaustion principle as long as 
it is accepted that Articles 28 through 30 EC are adaptable to the 
 
 155. This is obvious in cases where a clear distinction between goods and services is not 
possible because the effect of marketing products potentially falls—directly or indirectly—
within both Articles 28 and 49 EC.  See EC Treaty arts. 28, 49. 
 156. This follows simultaneously from the inapplicability of the TTR and VRR to 
contracts relating to end consumers and the general exhaustion doctrine limiting intellectual 
property rights as implemented in national laws. 
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current levels of European market integration.  The higher the level of 
integration becomes, the less it is necessary to rely on rules aimed at 
safeguarding free circulation; at higher levels of integration, the 
common market approaches a virtual free trade similar to, for instance, 
the United States.157 
A.  Partial Inapplicability of Article 30 EC? 
To the extent that competition law, including the European 
Commission’s practices,158 is becoming more lenient, the effect of 
exhaustion and, consequently, the concept of divisibility of control 
rights cannot be answered under Article 30 EC; this is, among other 
reasons, because certain restrictions are deemed as pro-competitive and, 
thereby, shift the scales toward the right owner’s interests.  The effect of 
competition rules in excess of core regulatory functions in exempting 
certain pro-competitive restraints is an exclusionary effect upon the 
additional application of Articles 28 and 30 EC—this is, of course, 
unless the position is taken that the rule on exhaustion, as a matter of 
the free movement of goods, has resulted in a proprietary limitation of 
national intellectual property rights or that the implementation of the 
exhaustion rule is subject to an identical statutory interpretation in all 
Member States. 
According to this view, exhaustion occurs as a consequence of 
licensing,159 delimiting the potentially more generous scope under 
national law and denoting that third parties cannot be bound by 
permissible restraints.160  But, as outlined previously, not only is such a 
position not credible from a doctrinal point of view;161 but it also ignores 
the transformed approach in regard to the territoriality issue and 
forecloses any flexibility for adapting pro-competitive effects to an 
increased level of market integration.  This view aligns with similar 
views taken regarding the concept of the cumulative application under 
 
 157. The U.S. Patent Act permits territorial restrictions even as applied to a common 
national market, but it does curtail the patent owner’s control after the first sale to the 
consumer.  See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).  This solution amounts to a significant step away from 
the reward notion.  The licensor would be able to control the distribution up to the point 
when the article is physically in the hands of the consumer. 
 158. Commission Decision 95/373, supra note 102. 
 159. This is the case both as a matter of European Community law, see, e.g., Case 19/84, 
Pharmon BV v. Hoechst AG, 1985 E.C.R. 2281, and simultaneously domestic law. 
 160. More precisely, attempts of a licensor to employ divisible statutory intellectual 
property rights in order to divide the market and limit the effects of exhaustion violate the 
free movement of goods principle. 
 161. See supra Part III.A. 
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the Patent Licensing Block Exemption, suggesting a corresponding 
application of the competition and free movement of goods principle 
that a permissible restriction should not simultaneously be subject to 
additional constraints as a matter of market freedom.162  Such a position 
seeks to overcome the problem of the traditional exhaustion concept by 
rendering national intellectual property rights applicable unless 
discriminatory or abusive conduct results.  Article 30 EC was perceived 
as inapplicable to sheer limitations arising out of permissible restraints.  
What is crucial in this context is that such an approach had to operate 
against the extremely severe interpretation that, by then, unswervingly 
favored the free movement of goods principle163 and resulted in the 
European license doctrine.  An open exclusive licensing agreement 
containing permissible clauses, thus, remained unenforceable because 
those clauses contravened Article 28 EC.  The effect was to curtail a 
patentee’s right as a matter of fostering market integration,164 but by 
then the jurisprudence on Article 30 EC was in line with both the more 
restrictive provisions on patent licensing165 and the accepted perception 
that exhaustion was inextricably coupled with the act of licensing.166 
The question now emerges in a different regulatory context to the 
extent that the TTR permits control over subsequent sales even in 
closed licenses allowing absolute territorial protection.167  If a licensor is 
allowed to reserve territories, the application of Article 30 EC in order 
to advertently constrain such control would preempt pro-competitive 
effects because the licensor would be restricted to seeking contractual 
redress against his or her licensee.  If, therefore, the TTR and, 
presumably, Article 81(1) EC168 exempt territorial restrictions by 
 
 162. See Oliver Axster, Offene Fragen unter der EG-Gruppenfreistellungsverordnung 
für Patentlizenzverträge, 1982 GRUR INT. 581.  Hence, if the clause in question is enforceable 
under national intellectual property laws and does not violate the provisions on anti-
competitive agreements, exhaustion does not occur as a matter of European Community law, 
although it may occur as a matter of national law.  See also Valentine Korah, The Limitation 
of Copyright and Patents by the Rules for the Free Movement of Goods in the European 
Common Market, 14 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 7 (1982). 
 163. Venit, supra note 110, at 517. 
 164. This effect, though, has a certain degree of inconsistency.  See GORMLEY, supra 
note 132, at 233; Schödermeier, supra note 132. 
 165. Commission Regulation 2349/84, supra note 49, art. 1 (applying to open exclusive 
and nonexclusive licenses only); see Dieter Hoffmann & Orlagh O’Farrell, The “Open 
Exclusive License”—Scope and Consequences, 6 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 104, 108 (1984). 
 166. Case 187/80, Merck & Co. v. Stephar BV, 1981 E.C.R. 2063. 
 167. See Case 27/87, Erauw-Jacquéry v. La Hesibignonne, 1988 E.C.R. 1919; Case 
262/81, Coditel v. Ciné Vog Films (Coditel II), 1982 E.C.R. 3381. 
 168. In the TTR Guidelines, the Commission asserts that it will apply the same 
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allowing some degree of proprietary control arising out of statutory 
rights,169 then this would denote a shift toward a greater recognition of 
intellectual property rights and a partial withdrawal of the free 
circulation argument since the permissible exercise on the basis of 
harmonized law cannot be discriminatory. 
Moreover, an additional question arises:  whether Article 28 EC can 
apply at all.  If territorial restrictions, as a matter of national intellectual 
property laws, are deemed pro-competitive,170 then there is no prospect 
for additionally being able to invoke Article 30 EC because it may be 
argued that a permissible restraint on the basis of European Community 
law cannot simultaneously constitute a measure having equivalent 
effect; it applies irrespective of possible discrepancies in national laws, 
whether or not such restrictions go beyond the national intellectual 
property rights, because all intellectual property systems are treated 
equally.  It may also be suggested that if Article 28 EC applies only with 
respect to territorial discrepancies, then the exercise of a permissible 
right is not an obstacle to the free movement of goods. 
Consequently, there is no capacity for applying a proportionality test 
under Article 30 EC because dogmatically the permissibility of 
territorial restrictions is resolved under secondary legislation that takes 
precedence insofar as it regulates the issues in question, and a 
restraining clause is not a result of divergences in the scope of national 
intellectual property rights because the rights are still granted as a 
bundle of national and, thus, territorial rights.  The question of 
exhaustion under Article 30 EC, therefore, cannot arise; it can only arise 
once national discrepancies in the concrete application of national 
intellectual property laws distort the concept of free movement of 
goods.  Consequentially, the additional applicability of Article 30 EC 
will depend upon the scope given to a permissible territorial restriction 
under the block exemptions, and the greater the scope is as a matter of 
judicial interpretation, the higher the harmonizing effect will be.  An 
interpretation that permits the owner control until the very act of 
putting the article on the market will, therefore, foreclose the 
application of Article 30 EC because it harmonizes the scope of national 
intellectual property rights to a significant degree.  A more constrained 
 
principles to other intellectual property categories as to those expressly covered.  TTR 
Guidelines, supra note 41, at 10. 
 169. Commission Decision 95/373, supra note 102. 
 170. See Hugh C. Hansen, International Exhaustion:  An Economic and Non-Economic 
Policy Analysis, 6 INT’L INTELL. PROP. L. & POL’Y 114-1, 114-9 to -10 (2001). 
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view will engender an expanded scope for national perceptions that, if 
divergent, will resurrect the free movement of goods issues. 
It follows that, in the sphere of such partial harmonization of 
licensing rules, the avenue taken toward a balancing of interests is not 
open because Article 28 EC, as a prerequisite, refers to discrepancies 
between national laws that have “equivalent effect,” but such effect is 
necessarily absent if the rules on restrictive licenses are harmonized 
within the scope of the TTR or VRR.171  Therefore, in relation to the 
doctrinal foundation of the exhaustion principle as an element of Article 
30 EC, the question of exhaustion cannot arise.  Therefore, the 
provisions on the free movement of goods cannot be applied to limit the 
permissible exercise of intellectual property rights under competition 
law. 
What can be asserted is that at least some modest level of 
harmonization exists, and good reasons can be put forward to preclude 
the application of Article 30 EC both as a matter of dogmatic 
consistency and for substantive reasons to not revert back to 
indiscriminate restrictions on grounds of the free circulation of goods.  
The reality, though, is that no true harmonization has been achieved 
with respect to the divisibility of the exploitation rights and the 
subsequent effects this has on notions of national exhaustion. 
B.  Territorial Restraints and National Exhaustion Rules 
The concept of territorial restraints under competition law shows a 
remarkable lack of harmonizing power because it leaves a number of 
blind spots.  If it permits territorial restrictions as a matter of exercising 
national intellectual property rights, it excludes the applicability of 
Article 28 EC to the extent that Member States employ identical 
concepts of national exhaustion, matching rules with respect to the 
effect of territorial restrictions in terms of absolute (proprietary) or 
relative (contractual) protection.172  As will be demonstrated in the 
discussion that follows, this is not the case. 
National systems may employ different notions of national 
exhaustion, particularly in regard to differentiations at varying market 
levels.  The ambiguity of block exemptions as to the effect of 
permissible restraints on exhaustion also triggers a number of blind 
spots.  Dogmatically, the exclusion of the proportionality test, under 
 
 171. See EC Treaty art. 28; see also 2004 TTR, supra note 24; VRR, supra note 25. 
 172. Such a level of harmonization can be achieved if the scope of permissible restraints 
is incorporated into statutory intellectual property laws. 
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which the exhaustion principle has developed, implies that Articles 28 
through 30 EC cannot be invoked in relation to overriding public 
interests safeguarding the free circulation of goods.173  The problem will 
have to shift to national law or be reintroduced under a different 
heading, such as consumer protection.  In turn, the admissibility of 
territorial restraints largely depends on national notions of the scope of 
licenses. 
Under various national laws, the discrepancies are striking and the 
correct legal position is often blurred.  National laws normally do not 
permit territorial restraints, but complex licensing agreements may 
involve a division of product markets.  Regarding the divisibility of 
rights,174 German copyright law, for example, permits the division of 
distribution rights insofar as distinct product markets are concerned.175  
This follows from Article 31(4) of the German Copyright Act, which 
generally preserves the right of an author to grant mutually exclusive 
licenses in relation to separate product markets.176  However, territorial 
restraints within the jurisdiction are not permissible.177  The effect of a 
contractual restraint upon exhaustion remains dubious, and the extent 
to which it can bind a bona fide third-party purchaser is debatable.  In 
the OEM-Software decision, the German Federal Court of Justice, 
Bundesgerichtshof (BGH), rejected any effect of an express limitation 
on the occurrence of exhaustion.178  The court held that imposing an 
obligation on a wholesaler to sell certain types of software only when 
attached to hardware was unenforceable because exhaustion had 
occurred at the time when the software was issued to the wholesaler.179  
The court did not refer to the scope of the contractual limitations, as 
such, but it did point to the effects upon consumer protection, 
suggesting that copies issued without consent would be exhausted as a 
matter of a limitation on proprietary rights, even before the copy had 
reached the end consumer.180 
 
 173. See EC Treaty arts. 28, 30. 
 174. SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS:  1886–1986 400 (1987). 
 175. See Urheberrechtsgesetz [UrhG] [Authors Rights Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBl. 1 at 
1273, art. 31(4) (F.R.G.). 
 176. Id. 
 177. See GERHARD SCHRICKER, URHEBERRECHT:  KOMMENTAR § 17 (2d ed. 1999). 
 178. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], June 7, 2000, I ZR 244/97 
(F.R.G.), available at http://www.jurpc.de/rechtspr/20000220.htm. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
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In the United Kingdom, the exact circumstances for the occurrence 
of exhaustion are debated in a similar way.181  The exhaustion principle 
was introduced into the intellectual property laws of the United 
Kingdom only as a consequence of European harmonization.  The 
traditional view was that a right holder enjoyed an unlimited right to 
control distribution channels,182 and intellectual property rights were 
perceived to be divisible in this regard.183  Under the laws of the United 
Kingdom, the principal issue for exhaustion is identifying the relevant 
stage in a distribution chain in which exhaustion will occur.184  The 
general view is that it should do so before the goods reach the consumer 
market, although this rationale has been explained with reference to 
preventing secondary liability for consumers.185  Section 18(2) of the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, for instance, refers to subsequent 
acts of distribution with respect to copyrighted works.186  It is clear that 
copies issued without consent will infringe, and a license must be 
present.187  The case law, however, varies with regard to the divisibility 
of rights and the proprietary effects in cases where consent is limited to 
certain product or territorial markets.188  In analyzing this matter, some 
commentators prefer the “destination theory”189 while others advocate 
for the “disposition theory.”190  In France and Belgium, a copyright 
owner is able to bind third-party purchasers beyond the first market 
level on the basis of a general destination right—droit de destination.191  
In the United States, territorial restrictions are generally perceived as 
 
 181. John Phillips & Lionel Bentley, Copyright Issues:  The Mysteries of Section 18, 21 
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 133, 137–38 (1999). 
 182. See Beecham Group Ltd. v. Int’l Prods. Ltd., [1968] R.P.C. 129, 135–36 (Kenya) 
(extending the right to putting articles on the market abroad); Dunlop Rubber Co. v. Longlife 
Battery Depot, [1958] R.P.C. 473, 476 (U.K.). 
 183. See sources cited supra note 182. 
 184. Phillips & Bentley, supra note 181, 137–38. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 18(2) (Eng.). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Nelson v. Rye, [1996] F.S.R. 313 (U.K.) (suggesting that exhaustion does not occur 
between a manufacturer and a trader); see also Football Ass’n Premier League Ltd. v. Panini 
UK Ltd., [2003] EWCA (Civ) 995 (Eng.). 
 189. HUGH LADDIE ET AL., THE MODERN LAW OF COPYRIGHT 387–90 (1980). 
 190. See Infabrics Ltd. v. Jaytex Ltd., [1982] A.C. 1 (regarding secondary infringement 
rules under the copyright laws of the United Kingdom); see also Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act §§ 22–26. 
 191. See FR. S. DEB. 317 (Apr. 28, 1999) (statement of Sen. Danièle Pourtaud), 
available at http://cubitus.senat.fr/rap/198-317/198-3170.html; see also Axel Metzger, 
Erschöpfung des urheberrechtlichen Verbreitungsrechts bei vertikalen Vertriebsbindungen, 
2001 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 210. 
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pro-competitive,192 but antitrust law does not allow restrictions beyond 
the first sale of a patented article.193 
These rather divergent approaches result in blind spots.  Blind spots 
in relation to “pure” territorial restrictions concern the scope of control 
over market levels—that is, the occurrence of exhaustion as a matter of 
national law.  The respective exhaustion rules established in secondary 
intellectual property legislation do not deal with contractual divisibility, 
nor do the block exemptions.  This reintroduces the issues of free 
circulation addressed under Article 28 EC, albeit under a different 
heading.  If the first act of licensing does not exhaust the right, it 
becomes a matter of national law to define the scope of intellectual 
property licensing to permit the owner control over subsequent acts of 
distribution.  Therefore, a restriction, territorial or otherwise, in a cross-
border licensing contract remains subject to Article 28 EC provided that 
it constitutes a measure having equivalent effect.  This will be the case if 
such a restriction constitutes an indirect restriction, which will normally 
be the case if the national intellectual property laws of the countries in 
question are divergent on the scope and effect of such a restriction. 
As far as territorial restrictions are concerned, the effect of non-
exhaustion following the first act of licensing needs to be reconciled 
with the criteria applicable under Article 81(1) EC.194  It is clear that the 
last act of distribution will exhaust the right,195 but there is tremendous 
ambiguity as to the exercise of statutory rights before that point; the 
traditional jurisprudence on European exhaustion is unhelpful to the 
extent that the rules on territorial restrictions have been relaxed.  In 
 
 192. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (finding a territorial 
distribution illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act because it harmed competition among 
distributors).  The Court’s decision in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. sparked 
controversy that, in turn, generated a considerable amount of scholarly work focusing on the 
economic effects of vertical arrangements.  Ultimately, territorial restraints could be used to 
address the “free-rider phenomenon.”  See also Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 
36 (1977) (concluding that a per se illegal approach to territorial restraints was fallacious).  
The Court pointed out that vertical restraints should be evaluated under the rule of reason.  
Id.  The lawfulness of a particular vertical restraint depends upon whether the restraint, on 
balance, restricts or promotes competition.  See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 
435 U.S. 679 (1978) (interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 261 to allow territorial divisibility of patent 
distribution licenses to the whole or any specified part of the United States). 
 193. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942); Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 
Wall.) 453 (1873).  Therefore, if a territorial restriction in a license purports to control conduct 
beyond the first sale, the license would not be protected from antitrust scrutiny under § 261 of 
the U.S. Patent Act.  See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000). 
 194. See EC Treaty art. 81(1). 
 195. This is true both as a matter of European Community law and as a consequence of 
implemented directives concerning the exhaustion rule. 
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relation to whether such a restriction may be exempt from Article 81(1) 
EC, different criteria will apply.  It is an issue of balancing pro-
competitive effects of, for instance, restrictions placed upon product 
markets, such as preventing free riding, with more general concerns, 
such as free circulation of goods.  The effect is that, due to the 
inapplicability of Article 30 EC, inferences have to be derived from the 
arsenal of national laws.  Conversely, if Articles 28 and 30 EC are 
deemed applicable, then the question is one of national divergences 
regarding the scope of divisibility of exploitation rights, which then 
needs to be justified under Article 30 EC.  However, as a matter of the 
free movement of goods principle, it is unclear what parameters can be 
taken into account.  This will induce either a preference for the 
strictest196 or the most lenient national system.197 
C.  Non-Territorial Restraints and European Exhaustion 
If block exemptions permit a rights holder to oppose reimports on 
the strength of divided intellectual property exploitation rights devoid 
of the exhaustion effect, then the related issue emerges of whether 
license clauses restricting the product market can be enforced.  
Restrictions imposed upon the product market in which a protected 
article may be sold under the stipulations of a licensing agreement are 
common.  A licensor has an economic interest in being able to separate 
product markets.  Such separation is permissive under national laws as 
long as it does not contravene domestic competition law and go beyond 
the scope of the national intellectual property right granted by statute. 
The TTR apparently permits such restrictions provided that the 
market share thresholds are not exceeded; however, there is no 
guidance or case law to support this.198  Even so, the TTR will only apply 
provided that the contract, at its core, pertains to more than a supply 
and distribution agreement,199 which in most cases will not come to pass.  
The VRR allows such separation provided that the agreement pertains 
to ancillary intellectual property rights and falls outside the scope of 
 
 196. Such a result potentially arises from a lowest common denominator solution under 
a general free movement of goods solution. 
 197. According to the jurisprudence of the ECJ, the scope of intellectual property 
rights—in the absence of European harmonization—remains a matter of national law; 
therefore, an absolute general preference for the free movement of goods cannot be 
surmised.  See Case 158/86, Warner Bros. v. Christiansen, 1988 E.C.R. 2605. 
 198. See generally 2004 TTR, supra note 24. 
 199. Id. recital (19). 
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Article 4.200  But even if such a conclusion can be drawn, it is difficult to 
imagine a contract where the intellectual property right, itself, serves as 
a basis for different markets.201 
The separability into different market segments does not result from 
the territorial nature of the intellectual property rights in the sense that 
the rights conferred are still a bundle of national property rights.  The 
proprietary effect emanates from the substantive rules of national 
intellectual property laws and the extent to which those laws allow for 
separation into product markets.  Likewise, agreements restricting the 
ability of licensees to sell in different product markets raise the issue of 
exhaustion.  If the respective block exemptions permit this restriction, it 
remains doubtful whether such a clause has proprietary effect in that the 
distribution right has not been exhausted in cases where the articles 
have been sold into different product markets.  This market partitioning 
has the same effect as territorial licenses in that it indirectly impacts 
upon the ability of licensees to sell into different markets in other 
territories of the European Community.  This would then allow the 
application of Articles 28 and 30 EC, provided that the respective 
distribution rights have not been exhausted, and, at present, this is 
largely a problem of national law. 
In Germany, for instance, restrictions on product markets are 
contractually enforceable vis-à-vis the licensee provided that, from a 
commercial standpoint, the markets defined in the agreement are 
distinguishable.202  The question becomes one of whether further sales 
by third parties can be controlled by the rights owner on the strength of 
the distribution right.  In the OEM-Software case, the BGH concluded 
that the exhaustion rule prevailed because the national distribution right 
under copyright law merely granted a right of putting the article on the 
market for the first time without addressing the effect of a proprietary 
restriction.203  Such restrictions have prevailed under the laws of 
Germany and the United Kingdom, but in France and Belgium, the 
proprietary effect of a distribution license restricted to certain product 
markets allows functional control of the entire distribution chain.204  
 
 200. VRR, supra note 25, art. 4. 
 201. See id. 
 202. See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Nov. 21, 1958, I ZR 
98/57, 1959 GRUR 200, 202. 
 203. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], June 7, 2000, I ZR 244/97 
(F.R.G.), available at http://www.jurpc.de/rechtspr/20000220.htm; see SCHRICKER, supra note 
177. 
 204. See, e.g., Law No. 92-597 of July 1, 1992, art. L. 122-6, Journal Officiel de la 
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Hence, the proprietary effect of the restriction is limited to the 
copyright owner’s relationship with the first licensee or purchaser, but it 
cannot be invoked against any further sale.205  The BGH, thus, favored 
market freedom over intellectual property rights.206  That is, national 
exhaustion was deemed to have occurred as a matter of accomplishing a 
high level of free circulation.  A restriction on product markets that is 
permissible under national law can have the effect of indirectly 
restricting reimports on a cross-border level, for instance, if the licensor 
licenses a manufacturer to sell copies of books only to be sold in book 
clubs.  Here, the right is exercised, not as matter of an expressly 
permissible conduct, but as a consequence of the divisibility of the 
statutory right in national law.  An attempt to keep out articles from the 
original territory amounts to a territorial restriction that is not exempt 
due to the nature of the contract.  But the substantive rationale is the 
same—the division into separate product markets is a device to 
encourage intra-brand competition. 
From an antitrust standpoint, the extent to which such clauses 
should be restricted is an issue of the pro-competitive effects.  From a 
copyright standpoint, it is an issue of the scope of proprietary 
exploitation rights.  If it is permissible as a matter of national law, the 
competition issue is conclusive because the exercise of divided statutory 
rights is within the scope of national laws.  In relation to the free 
movement of goods, the situation is no different except for the fact that 
Article 30 EC can apply due to the effect of the statutory right allowing 
market divisions and operability as an obstacle to free trade.  The issue 
of nondiscriminatory but divergent national rules on exploitation rights 
has already been resolved to the effect that it remains a matter of 
national law to define its scope.207  A national rule permitting a more 
extensive interpretation vis-à-vis the divisibility of exploitation rights is 
functionally no different from the existence of more or less generous 
economic rights.  The true issue is the ensuing conflict with the domestic 
exhaustion principle. 
Under general rules of statutory interpretation, this would normally 
result in an obligation to construe such exhaustion rules in conformity 
 
République Francaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], July 3, 1992. 
 205. See, e.g., id. 
 206. See sources cited supra note 203. 
 207. See Case 35/87, Thetford Corp. v. Fiamma, 1988 E.C.R. 3585 (permitting the U.K. 
relative novelty doctrine); Case 158/86, Warner Bros. v. Christiansen, 1988 E.C.R. 2605 
(accepting nondiscriminatory divergences in relation to the specific Danish Lending Right); 
see also KORAH, supra note 28, at 300. 
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with models under secondary intellectual property legislation, but in 
relation to the issue here the legislation remains eerily silent.  National 
courts must refer to the traditional notions and doctrinal framework of 
exhaustion or, alternatively, apply the customarily restrictive European 
exhaustion concept. 
This is specifically problematic in relation to the fundamental 
divergences between the copyright and droit d’auteur systems.  The 
proprietary scope of exploitation rights will be influenced by the 
respective copyright rationales, tending to allow a greater scope of 
control within author right systems given the stronger impact of 
personality rights.  Conversely, in the OEM-Software case, for example, 
the BGH merely referred to the aim of “free circulation.”208  An 
absolute proprietary effect of divided rights was, thereby, avoided.209  
Operating within the framework of European law, this view is difficult 
to reconcile with the net pro-competitive effects of distribution 
agreements, but even on a national level, the prevailing effect of 
exhaustion will result in a tendency toward direct sales.  The effect may 
well be to destroy separate levels in a distribution chain.  Therefore, 
even if the block exemptions are inapplicable, such restriction may be 
exempt under Article 81(1) EC.210 
CONCLUSION 
The question of the interface between the principle of free 
movement of goods and the restrictive practices in intellectual property 
licenses must be assessed with renewed vigor.  The block exemptions 
now permit territorial and other restraints without addressing the 
exhaustion issue per se.  From an economic perspective, this permits 
inferences based on a pro-competitive rationale of restrictions on both 
territorial and product markets. 
From a dogmatic standpoint, the problem pertains to the validity of 
clauses in licensing agreements that are, therefore, not voided as a 
matter of national contract law.  It otherwise denotes that rules derived 
from secondary legislation are applied based upon the scope of national 
intellectual property rights, causing a particular problem of 
interpretation.  Exhaustion might not occur in cases where secondary 
legislation expressly preserves a right to limit licensing territories, and it 
 
 208. See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 209. See sources cited supra note 203. 
 210. See A. Seffer & J. Beninca, OEM-Klauseln unter dem Gesichtspunkt des 
europäischen Kartellrechts, 2004 DER IT-RECHTS-BERATER [ITRB] 210, 213. 
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would not apply when the agreement in question is not primarily 
concerned with intellectual property licensing.  Given the very delicate 
boundary between vertical restraints and technology transfers, such 
deduction would certainly lead to legal uncertainty.211  The better view is 
to treat those provisions, as far as exhaustion is concerned, as neutral. 
The question that remains concerns the impact of the principle of 
free movement of goods.  In relation to exhaustion, the question is 
whether the notion of a European exhaustion rule—in the sense of a 
first sale doctrine—is viable, and, if so, why.  There are two ways to 
address the issue.  The first is to simply agree upon a general rationale 
to limit the exercise of intellectual property rights.  This approach 
appears to be the predominant conclusion derived from the judicature 
on parallel imports, and it is supported by the existence of national rules 
encompassing the first sale doctrine as a consequence of European 
Community legislation in the intellectual property sphere.  There are, 
however, a number of arguments that reveal that the general notion of a 
shared exhaustion rule—that is, the inference of judicature primarily 
concerned with limiting the absolute and proprietary scope of 
intellectual property rights—is, at the least, misleading.  The 
promulgation of an overarching European exhaustion principle has 
been, if at all, a response to the dynamics of shaping a single market 
rather than an attempt to approximate intellectual property laws.  
“Exhaustion” has become a metaphor for a variety of approaches that 
sought to delineate permitted and improper exercises of intellectual 
property rights regarding the free movement of goods. 
The dissenting views, on the other hand, are unpersuasive.  The 
effect of national laws that are divergent regarding the scope of 
divisibility may be to create measures having equivalent effects in the 
sense that a more restrictive scope under national law may be exercised 
so as to prevent imports; some jurisdictions might allow a greater scope 
of control encompassing further market levels.  But it is questionable 
whether Article 30 EC can address those problems. Although the 
disparities deemed as “measures having equivalent effect”212 arise out of 
the territorial nature of national intellectual property rights, their 
continued applications are different as a result of the respective 
proprietary scope of licensing rights under national laws. 
If, conversely, Article 30 EC were to be applied with respect to 
discrepancies arising from blind spots, which are not harmonized, the 
 
 211. See supra Part II.A. 
 212. EC Treaty art. 28. 
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effect would be a lowest common denominator solution based on the 
most austere national intellectual property system in order to artificially 
invoke the application of the exhaustion rule.  Such an approach is 
potentially inconsistent with the more lenient treatment of restraints in 
licensing contracts.  It would bar substantive arguments pertaining to 
the rationale of permitting restraints on both territorial and product 
markets. 
The inadequacy of the current approach is that the very concept of 
Article 28 EC relies upon eliminating national discrepancies that 
constitute measures having equivalent effect.213  Its application to 
intellectual property has evoked a far-reaching discernment as a general 
substantive rule, which, given the dynamics of integration, is neither 
conceivable nor desirable.  Hence, the exhaustion principle is a line of 
argument that resulted from an initial distinction between existence and 
exercise and the related specific subject matter test.  It may, thus, be 
ignored to the extent that national intellectual property rights are 
harmonized with respect to the scope of the national exhaustion rule, 




 213. See id. 
